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During the last two decades, technological advancements to the size and performance of 
electronics have fostered the development of increasingly sophisticated and smaller 
satellites. Small satellites, or smallsats as they are commonly referred to, have recorded 
data on terrestrial and space environments, served as important test beds and risk reducers 
for emerging space technologies, and provided important hands-on educational 
opportunities for industry and academia. The decreased cost and improved performance 
of smallsats have opened up a wide range of space missions at a fraction of the cost of 
larger satellite systems that would have been unfathomable two short decades ago. The 
proliferation of smallsat technology opens up a world of new scientific possibilities and 
unique security challenges as well for all space-faring nations through the potential use of 
smallsats as anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. This thesis examines the historical 
development of ASAT systems for the United States, the former Soviet Union, and China 
and discusses how they have influenced each nation’s space policy. Finally, this thesis 
will address current efforts to mitigate space weapons, review the implications of 
smallsat technology development on current space policy, and suggest courses of action 
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Oh! I have slipped the surly bonds of Earth… And, while with silent lifting mind I’ve trod, 
The high untresspassed sanctity of space, Put out my hand and touched the face of God. 
 
— Pilot Officer Gillespie Magee, No 412 squadron, RCAF1 
 
A.  MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
 The interconnectedness of the sea, air, space, and cyber domains increases daily 
and the securing of that freedom will be one of the biggest security challenges of the 21st 
century.2 The accepted international conventions that apply throughout the sea and air 
domains do not apply within the space domain. The space environment in which 
spacecraft operate is distinctive and movement is governed by the laws of gravity, 
centripetal acceleration, and orbital mechanics.3 The harsh, natural environment of space 
provides a challenge to all satellite systems where lethal radiation, storms of 
micrometeoroids, extreme variations of temperature, and man-made debris can damage or 
even destroy unshielded payloads, sensors, and spacecraft. Despite these existing 
challenges, global dependence on space as an integral part of communications, scientific, 
and economic networks has grown at a staggering pace as global space spending 
increased $20 billion from 2009 to 2010 even in the aftermath of a worldwide economic 
recession to reach an estimated total of $276.5 billion.4  
 Space technology has been a significant contributor to globalization and the 
United States government (USG) has become ever increasingly reliant upon space since 
the launch of its first satellites in 1958. This reliance is exemplified by the $64.6 billion 
Fiscal Year 2010 (FY10) space budget, parceled out between the Department of Defense 
                                                 
1 For full verse of poem see “High Flight,” (n.d.), http://www.deltaweb.co.uk/spitfire/hiflight.htm. 
2 Patrick M. Cronin, Securing Freedom in the Global Commons (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2010), page ix.  
3 Any good orbital mechanics or physics book discusses how the laws of physics work in space. A 
good physics reference that can be found online is David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The 
Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, 2005). 
4 The Space Foundation, Global Space Activity Report 2011, Executive Summary, 6.   
http://www.thespacereport.org/files/The_Space_Report_2011_exec_summary.pdf. 
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(DoD), Intelligence Community (IC), and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). The U.S. budget is almost a factor of three more than the 
combined budgets of the remaining fifty countries, international consortia, and 
nongovernmental organizations who invested in space in FY105 and of the estimated 958 
active satellites as of October 2011, almost half are USG owned platforms.6 The United 
States as a whole has devoted a greater percentage of its gross domestic product to 
technology development in space than any other country. As a result of this significant 
investment, the United States holds a substantial asymmetrical advantage over near peers 
in capability and its dependence on space as a critical military force enabler places it at 
risk of a potential “Space Pearl Harbor.”7 The loss or denial of critical space assets from 
emerging technological threats such as smallsats has the potential to reduce the USG 
from “an information age war machine to an industrial age war machine.”8 
 Given this background of emerging space challenges, this thesis examines three 
questions in detail.  How has the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) systems by the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and China influenced the space security of each nation? 
Can the lessons learned from the fifty year development of ASAT systems be applied to 
the recent advancements in small satellite technology, which is emerging as a potential 
ASAT technology? To what extent will small satellite systems technology affect each 
nation’s current space policy and how can these challenges to the collective space 
security environment be overcome? President Obama has called “on all nations to work 
together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space to preserve this right for the 
benefit of future generations.”9 Proponents of enhanced cooperation argue that 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 6. 




7 See U.S. House of Representatives, Report of the Commission to Assess United States National 
Security Space Management and Organization, 8. From here on, the report will be referenced as the Space 
Commission report.   
8 “Transcript of Lieutenant General Michael Maples’ Interview,” February 8, 2008, 
http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Press/trans01.pdf. 
9 National Space Policy of the United States of America, June 28, 2010, 2.  
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collaboration would serve as a valuable tool for combating the proliferation of space 
weapons and represent a significant step toward collective space security. Cooperation 
further allows the United States “to secure the space domain for peaceful purpose and to 
protect space assets from all hazards.”10 Opponents of cooperation argue that 
collaboration would jeopardize the national security of the United States by putting many 
of its space systems at risk, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of space as a tremendous 
force multiplier for the armed services.   
B.  IMPORTANCE 
 With the launch of the Sputnik satellite into low earth orbit (LEO) during the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957–1958, the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) officially started the modern Space Age. The Soviet launch 
was quickly followed by the successful launches of the Explorer I and Vanguard I 
satellites by the U.S. government. Fear and suspicion pervaded the relations between 
these two countries during the highly symbolic Cold War and the resulting rivalry planted 
the seeds for what would evolve to become initially a hostile but eventually militarily 
restrained U.S.—Soviet space relationship throughout most of the next three decades. 
 As the technology of orbital imagery and communications matured, space quickly 
became recognized as the key to not only monitor and observe the adversary through 
national technical means, but to safeguard national assets for security as well. The United 
States and the Soviet Union moved through several different periods of cooperation and 
detente throughout the lifetime and conclusion of the Cold War that were highly 
dependent on the geopolitical context and events of the time. Although each nation 
ultimately developed, evaluated, and tested ASAT weapon systems as a hedging strategy, 
neither side employed an ASAT system against the other. The military space competition 
of the space age during the Cold War resulted in many lessons learned and more 
importantly a collective approach to space security between the nations.  
 Following the conclusion of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the United States experienced a fundamental change to the collective space 
                                                 
10 Nancy Gallagher, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,” Astropolitics, 8, no. 2–3 
(May 2010): 257. 
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security environment. Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s space program suffered severe 
budget cuts and a lack of funding, which caused a radical transformation of its space 
industry. The 2000 U.S. presidential elections resulted in the election of the 
neoconservative George W. Bush administration, which implemented broad changes to 
the existing space security paradigm and abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty. The early 21st century also has seen the emergence of China as a third main actor 
in space through its successful manned spaceflight and subsequent testing of an ASAT 
system in January of 2007. 
  With globalization and the continued proliferation and easy accessibility of space 
technology, developing countries such as Nigeria, Venezuela, and Iran are joining the 
number of space-faring countries and add to the growing number of state actors. Space 
offers a wide range of tangible benefits from urban planning, to weather and crop 
forecasting, and enhanced communications. Space technology plays an important role as 
a facilitator of this increasing globalization. The attractiveness of small satellites, or 
smallsats as they are commonly called, can provide the accessibility of space with 
decreased cost and acquisition timelines. The threat of smallsats as potential ASAT 
systems though has emerged as a concern of the major space actors.  
C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
 Competition in space has existed since the advent of spaceflight and this rivalry 
has often resulted in nations challenging each other not only for the derived benefits of 
space, but for national prestige as well. The United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, and 
China own the preponderance of space assets and their interactions can be best 
understood through the study of the international relations theory known as the security 
dilemma.11 A security dilemma results when states with fundamentally compatible 
security goals end up in competition with each other. The irony of the security dilemma is 
that when a state tries to increase its own security, it actually decreases the security of 
other states. This dilemma typically starts a vicious cycle of reaction and response to a 
competing state.  
                                                 
11 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 5–
6. 
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 Each of these states acts to best serve that state’s vital interests and during most of 
the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union maintained a relationship of both 
competition and confrontation. This relationship evolved to become a more cooperative 
space relationship in the late 1980s and 1990s. Recent space policy in the 2000s has again 
undergone a change and the U.S. space policy under the Bush administration and the Hu 
Jintao regime in China has revived the dormant security dilemma of space. This analysis 
will examine the effects of technology on past national policies and try to project the role 
that smallsat technologies might have on future national strategy and politics.   
 Since the launch of Sputnik, the debate of militarization versus the weaponization 
has been waged between the military and the senior leadership in the space-faring 
nations. Space was initially viewed as a medium outside the traditional rules of rights of 
overflight and later became extended into the idea of the “sanctuary of space.” This 
sanctuary concept sought to maintain the idea that space is an important force multiplier 
that allows military operations to be conducted from space. This militarization greatly 
enhances the traditional ground-based forces through the provision of improved imagery, 
communications, and positioning, navigation, and timing. Space systems have been an 
important part of military operations since the launch of the first reconnaissance satellites 
and can be considered a passive system. Weaponization is uniquely distinct from 
militarization in that its mission is to defend space assets and to exploit the medium of 
space as an active system. This thesis will explore these important distinctions and how 
they relate to smallsat technology development and their implications on space policy.  
 Although smallsats offer a wide range of benefits to hopeful space-faring nations 
and users, the proliferation of this technology and the dual-use dilemma that results from 
its accessibility will continue to pose challenges to the USG.12 Decreased size results in 
more affordable launch and programmatic costs and technological improvements in solar 
cells, batteries, nano-electronics, and miniaturized sensors enable satellites to be a 
fraction of the size of their predecessors 40 years ago. Smallsats may be active or passive 
but are designed and built to orbit as individual entities. The mission space of smallsats is 
as varied as the satellite developer, but in an environment where orbital speeds exceed 
                                                 
12 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 6–7. 
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17,000 miles per hour in low-Earth orbit (LEO); these satellites can produce catastrophic 
results when collisions occur. A large percentage of space assets can be considered dual 
use in that they have distinct value to the military, civilian, and scientific sectors of 
society but simultaneously pose a threat to the space security environment.     
 Improving space cooperation is a necessary step to decreasing an existing security 
dilemma, but one big challenge to overcome is what form this enhanced collaboration 
would take place under and how the enhanced cooperation would be verified.  A 
recommended way forward could include the adoption and implementation of a space 
code of conduct as has been proposed recently by the Europeans.13 A code of conduct 
could provide a valuable set of legal rules or guidelines for all actors who operate in 
space and be an important first step toward the strengthening of existing treaties. A set of 
guidelines could establish and standardize valuable international norms for space actors 
to avoid incidents that could escalate into hostilities. 
 This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the emergence of smallsat technology 
will continue to destabilize an already tenuous space security environment unless clear 
space policy changes are implemented among all space actors. The thesis also reviews the 
arguments regarding space cooperation presented by proponents and opponents in the 
early decades of ASAT technology development and strives to identify new and revised 
arguments in the current debate.    
D.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The concept of ASAT systems has a long and storied history and paper studies for 
the use of weapons against satellites began in the United States as early as 1954.14 The 
U.S. military’s early interest in space weapons increased significantly with the successful 
launch of Sputnik in 1957. The use of military satellites soon became a critical 
contributor to U.S. national security with the Soviet Union developing a similar reliance 
on space assets. At stake is the potential loss of these systems during any conflict and the 
                                                 
13 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National 
Interests (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 323. 
14 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy 1945–1957 (Cornell, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1984), 22. 
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uncertainty their loss would inject into each country’s national security calculations. The 
employment of ASAT weapons against an adversary’s satellite could result in an 
unplanned and unwelcome escalation of hostilities.   
During the long quest for military superiority in space, both the United States and 
Soviet Union have pursued initiatives in favor of the “peaceful use of space.” Both sides 
early on realized the potentially destabilizing effects of space weapons and have 
investigated various frameworks advocating international recognition of outer space as a 
weapons free area.  Although ASATs were recognized as a destabilizing factor, the 
United States and Soviet Union seldom agreed on the issues at hand and bilateral talks 
often amounted to a restating of each nation’s position and little actual progress.15 The 
recent proliferation of small satellite technology and the number of actors who operate 
them are an additional challenge to overcome for any future international agreement. 
Although no multilateral agreement currently exists between the space powers today, the 
international space community has inherited a number of building blocks that could be 
used to draft future agreements to ban ASATs and the deployment of space weapons.  
1.  The History of Smallsats 
 During the last two decades, pronounced technological advancements to the 
miniaturization and performance of electronics have fostered the development of 
increasingly sophisticated and smaller satellites without the sacrifice of performance. 
Small satellites have recorded data on terrestrial and space environments, served as 
important test beds and risk reducers for emerging space technologies, and provided 
important hands-on educational opportunities for industry and academia.16 The decreased 
cost and improved performance of smallsats have opened up a wide range of space 
missions at a fraction of the cost of larger satellite systems that would have been 
unfathomable two short decades ago. Technology proliferation has produced a world of 
new scientific possibilities and unique security challenges for all space-faring nations.  
                                                 
15 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-satellite Weapons, Countermeasures and 
Arms Control (Washington: OTA, Sept 1985), 95–96.   
16 See G. Gilbert Moore chapter in, “The First Small Satellites; Sputnik, Explorer, and Vanguard,” in 
Small Satellites: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Henry Helvajain and Siegfried W. Janson (El Segundo, CA: 
The Aerospace Press, 2008 for a detailed discussion of smallsat usage.   
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 Although smallsats have been built and launched since the construction of 
Sputnik, they have only been classified according to mass since 1992.17 These satellites 
can be either active or passive, but each is designed to be a separate entity to allow it to 
achieve its mission objective. A classification system was first suggested by the 
University of Surrey Centre for Satellite Engineering Research in England, one of the 
pioneers of smallsat development. The system is based upon the International System of 
Units (SI) prefixes and has been readily adopted throughout the satellite community. 
Table 1 provides a listing of the smallsat size classifications where each class spans an 
order of magnitude in wet mass, defined as the weight of the satellite plus the weight of 
fuel.18 The traditional cutoff for a smallsat designation is nominally at the mini-satellite 
class with a mass less than 500 kilogram.  
 Smallsats can weigh less than 100 grams and are gaining in popularity as cheap 
alternatives to provide space capability to a wide range of space actors.  One class of 
smallsats that has become pervasive during the last decade is the CubeSat class, which 
has evolved as a standardized satellite no greater than a liter in volume (10 cm cube) and 
weighs less than 1.33 kg.19 CubeSats are a subset of the nanosat class and were designed 
to simply the satellite infrastructure with the dual goals of the simplification of small 
satellite infrastructure and the reduction of construction costs. This small class of 
satellites has become a valuable and inexpensive teaching tool for industry, academia, 
and educators alike resulting in the estimated launch of over 65 CubeSats as of November 
201120 and has multiple launches planned throughout FY12.21 These small platforms can 
be designed, purchased, and flown for total programmatic costs of less than $75,000 and 
have also drawn great interest from multiple industry and government sponsors because 
of their accessibility, cost, and modular commercial off the shelf (COTS) potential.  
                                                 
17  Siegrfried W. Janson, “The History of Small Satellites,” in Small Satellites: Past, Present, and 
Future, ed. Henry Helvajain and Siegfried W. Janson (El Segundo, CA: The Aerospace Press, 2008), 47. 
18 Ibid. 
19 See http://www.cubesat.org/ for a treasure trove of information regarding CubeSat specifications, 
launches, and general information regarding past and current technology initiatives and upcoming 
seminars, launches and conferences.  
20 See the astronautix launch manifest at http://www.astronautix.com/chrono/index.htm for a summary 
of all CubeSats launched since 2004.  
21 See www.cubesat.org website for a listing of the upcoming launch manifests for CubeSats.  
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Satellite Classification Wet Mass  
Large satellite >1000 kilograms  
Medium sized satellite 500–1000 kilograms  
Minisat 100–500 kilograms Mass cutoff for smallsats 
Microsat 10–100 kilograms  
Nanosat 1–10 kilograms CubeSats are considered a 
subset of this class 
Picosat 0.1–1 kilograms  
Femtosat <100 grams  
Table 1. Satellite mass classification table   
2.  The Proliferation of Smallsats 
 During the last fifty-plus years of spaceflight, more than 880 microsatellites, 
715 nanosatellites, and 40 picosatellites have been launched into space.22 With the initial 
complexity of early satellite and launch system construction, space launches typically 
consisted of small spacecraft with minimal redundancy and limited capability.  These 
satellites had the advantage of being cheaper and requiring smaller launch vehicles but 
had the disadvantage of much shorter lifetimes—requiring constant replenishment to 
maintain space capability. With the early success rate of many of the space actors, small 
payloads were a significant way to reduce the risk of losing both an expensive payload 
and launch vehicle in the event of a failed launch. After a level of launch proficiency was 
achieved by space-faring nations, the general tendency was to move to ever bigger 
satellites to provide a “better bang for your buck.” Table 2 illustrates the initial appeal of 
smallsats throughout the early years of spaceflight, its decline during the 1970s and 
1980s, and its reemergence during the last two decades.  
                                                 
22 Information pulled from astonautix chronological launch manifest at 
http://www.astronautix.com/chrono/index.htm. These numbers are calculated from listed satellite launch 
mass but should be used as only an estimate. Not all of the satellites and many of the classified satellites did 
not have a mass listed. The estimates are good ballpark figures to show a reliance on smaller satellites and 
to view emerging smaller size trends.  
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Table 2: Number of smallsats launched since 195723 
The Soviet Union throughout its history has been a big proponent of smaller 
satellites and launched nearly 500 military communication mini and microsatellites 
throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. The Soviet philosophy was to rely on 
cheaper and smaller (but short-lived) payloads to support many of their military needs, 
because they were better at producing boosters than electronics with high reliability and 
service life. Although the trend of national space actors typically has been to increase 
payload size, increased mass often brings with it an associated increase of cost, 
complexity, and risk. Given those factors, many space actors to include commercial and 
educational ventures and new space-faring nations with smaller budgets, have also been 
motivated to launch increasingly smaller payloads, although they may be increasingly 
reliable. Significant advances in space technology have allowed smallsats to become an 
                                                 
23 Ibid. Not all of the launched satellites on the launch manifests had listed masses. The results also 
include a disproportionate amount of Russian Strela and Cosmos communication satellites numbering over 
470 satellites that were produced from 1970–1992. These correlated results do, however, give a good idea 
of the general trend of the number of smallsats built and launched since 1957.  
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ever more affordable and attractive alternative to the larger payloads of yesteryear 
leading to a resurgence of smallsat launches and CubeSats in particular during the last 
decade.   
3.  The Political Impact of Smallsats  
 The political impact of smallsats throughout the community is an evolving facet 
of contemporary technology development and its effects on the development of national 
space policy. Although the number of countries who participate in space has expanded to 
include more than 50 space-faring countries24 the United States, Russia, and China 
continue to be the dominant national actors in space. These three nations have a 
combined total of nearly 600 active satellites in orbit, which comprises a total amount 
greater than 60% of all estimated active orbital bodies. An estimated distribution of each 
country’s space assets broken down into military, non-military, and mixed use is 
presented below in Table 3.  As the dominant actors in space with the majority of 
satellites, the space policies of each nation help shape the collective international space 
security environment and justify a closer examination of each nation.  
 
 
Table 3. Estimated national space assets 
                                                 


















E.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Even before the first launch of a Soviet spacecraft, the USG examined the role of 
dedicated military space program and feasibility studies were conducted by the armed 
services to assess the role of satellites within the military.25 The following decades saw 
the idea of space as a source of conflict or cooperation as an area of great research and an 
abundance of articles, studies, and books have been written on the subject. These include 
works of analysis by scholars assessing the issues, works of advocacy for and against 
space cooperation and weaponization, and reports written by groups unable to  
reach a consensus, but nonetheless attempting to initiate dialogue and to offer useful 
recommendations. 
 Space policy has been in constant evolution since the launch of Sputnik and 
differing schools of thought have emerged in the debate about space security that have 
had a great influence on the pursuit of ASAT systems. Space policy analysts typically 
categorize this discussion as the struggle between the ideas of space sanctuary versus 
space defense.26  According to Hays, this debate can be further broken down into a 
discussion of four schools of thought that include: the sanctuary school, the survivability 
school, the space control school, and the high ground school.27 The schools of thought 
are listed from the least to the most confrontational view on space weaponization and will 
be discussed briefly to assess their impact to ASAT development within U.S. space 
policy.  
 The idea of space as a sanctuary proposes that space should not be weaponized 
but rather, used as a means to enhance national security. This school of thought argues 
that space must be kept free of weapons and that ASATs should be prohibited since they 
threaten space systems which provide critical national capabilities.28 The survivability 
                                                 
25 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Space Policy 1945–1984, (Cornell: NY, Cornell 
University Press, 1985) 22–29. 
26 See Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, 
23 for a detailed discussion of space policy analysts’ schools of thought.  
27 Matthew Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2004), 12. 
28 Peter Hays, Struggling Towards a Space Doctrine: U.S. Military Space Plans, Program, and 
Perspectives During the Cold War, PhD dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1994, 22.  
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school of thought emerged during the 1960s as a result of Soviet development and testing 
of ASAT systems and was based on the idea that space systems are at greater risk for 
destruction than ground forces. This school of thought believes in the protection of space 
assets either through active or passive means to maintain military capability.29 The third 
school of thought to emerge has been the doctrine of space control, which posits that 
space superiority is a necessary prerequisite for military operations. This school believes 
that offensive and defensive operations will likely be conducted in space and that 
weapononization and ASATs play a fundamental role in maintaining the ability to 
operate in space while denying your adversary that same ability.30 The fourth and final 
school of thought is the high ground school, which envisions the domination of space as 
the key to enabling the control of the ground through force application from space. This 
doctrine envisions space as the critical factor in determining a battle’s outcome on ground 
and in the air and as such, space weapons and ASATs play a critical and necessary 
function.31 No one school of thought can completely describe the impetus for the 
development of ASAT weapons, but taken into context with the political events of the 
time, valuable insight can be gained from reviewing the nation’s motivation for the 
development of these systems.  
 Recently declassified reports on several of the U.S. reconnaissance and imagery 
systems and their payloads provide detailed information on the systems and their 
capability. The use of space technology such as ASATS to counter foreign satellites, 
though, has produced multiple studies and several noted books as well and.  several 
recent journals have investigated the role of smallsats and their impact on space security  
The majority of the writers on the space security environment have typically analyzed the 
material either with a chronological focus on the security environment or as a series of 
interrelated security topics.  This broad scope of literature has been critical to provide 
 
 
                                                 
29 C.S. Gray, “The Military Uses of Space: Space Is Not A Sanctuary,” Survival, Volume XXV, 
Number 5, September, October 1983, 196–197.  
30 Hays, Struggling Towards a Space Doctrine, 23–25. 
31 Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space, 13. 
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background information on past developments regarding ASAT development, the issues 
raised by the potential weaponization of space, and an overview of the collective space 
security environment. 
 Several prominent political scientists have authored articles in support of 
furthering cooperation among the space-faring nations. Space collaboration advocates 
view cooperation as an important and critical part of space governance and a significant 
step toward international cooperation. Many technical experts believe that cooperation 
advances the Obama Administration’s main space policy objectives and simultaneously 
enhances the overall space security.32 Proponents of space cooperation also argue that 
many of the lessons gained from nuclear strategy can be carried over to space policy  
to strengthen international collaboration33 and that the United States may be able to 
achieve its policy goals through the skillful employment of “enhanced cooperative 
engagement.”34  
Opponents of U.S. cooperation in space question believe that “Earth’s orbital 
space is a militarily and economically critical arena to the United States, and [that] it 
became a battleground in 1944 when the first operational Nazi Germany V-2 weapons 
briefly exited the Earth’s atmosphere.”35 Opponents also believe that a growing number 
of states have already developed the means to exploit space and to be able to conduct 
space warfare as evidenced by the Chinese ASAT test in 2007. With U.S. reliance on 
space services and the inherent vulnerabilities of orbiting satellites, opponents view U.S. 
space assets as likely targets in the event of a large scale military conflict.36 As the 
threats to U.S. space assets from multiple actors continues to evolve, the current debate 
over  
                                                 
32 Nancy Gallagher, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,” Astropolitics, 8, no. 2–3 
(May 2010): 256–279. 
33 James Clay Moltz, “Space and Strategy: A Conceptual versus Policy Analysis,” Astropolitics, 8, no. 
2–3 (May 2010): 113–116. 
34 James Clay Moltz, “Preventing Conflict in Space: Cooperative Engagement as a Possible U.S. 
Strategy,” Astropolitics, 4, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 121–129. 
35 Howard Kleinberg, “On War in Space,” Astropolitics, 5, no. 1 (January 2007), 1–27. 
36 Darren Huskinsson, “Protecting the Space Network and the Future of Self-Defense,” Astropolitics, 
5, no. 2 (May 2007), 123–143.  
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national space policy demonstrates how contentious the question of enhanced space 
cooperation could become in upcoming debates and highlights the importance of a well 
thought out U.S. space strategy.    
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
It is impractical in this thesis to examine the space technologies and space security 
policies of all the actors in space.  This thesis investigates the question at hand by 
focusing on the three most influential actors: the United States, Russia and China. In 
other words, this is a comparative study investigating the priorities for the space security 
of the United States, Russia, and China.  
Noted American political scientist James N. Rosenau distinguishes between 
orientations, plans, and behavior in his conception of foreign policy.37 While 
acknowledging the importance of the first element, this thesis concentrates on the latter 
two. The investigation focuses on the specific features of these three countries’ defense 
policies such as the main threats identified, space policies implemented, and space 
technologies developed. The duration and conclusion of the Cold War, the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 in the United States, and the advancement of satellite technology have had 
significant effects on each nation’s threat perceptions. This thesis identifies what each 
nation has perceived as the main threats to space security followed by the actions each 
state has undertaken to attain its desired security goals. Finally, the comparison of these 
three cases assesses each nation’s impact on the collective space security environment to 
determine whether any significant changes in the ASAT debate have emerged in the 
intervening decade as smallsat technology and the numbers of space actors have evolved. 
Historical testimonies and articles from senior officials in the Department of Defense, the 
armed services, and the national laboratories serve as primary sources of information during 
the early period of discussion. Other primary sources include works of analysis and advocacy 
concerning the implications for U.S. space security as discussed in the literature review.   
                                                 
37 James N. Rosenau, “The Study of Foreign Policy” in World Politics – An Introduction, eds. James 
Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Gavin Boyd (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 15–35.  
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G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the historical 
and current technological development of ASAT systems by the United States and its 
influence on the evolution and current U.S. space policy. Chapter III discusses the 
historical and current technological development of both the former Soviet Union and 
later Russia and the impact of this development on current Russian space policy.  Chapter 
IV examines the emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a major space actor 
during the last decade and its recent development and test of ASAT and space control 
technology.  Chapter V analyzes successful and failed ASAT arms control initiatives and 
examines possible arms control measures for smallsats.  The chapter also examines the 
use of treaties or codes of conduct to mitigate potential future conflict.  In its conclusion, 
this thesis considers whether the technological advancements since 2000 have bolstered 
arguments for the adoption of a code of conduct for all space-faring nations. The decision 
by the United States to ratify a space code of conduct remains difficult to predict due to 
lingering doubts about the ability and resolve of the United Nations (U.N.) to enforce 





II. U.S. SPACE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
The eyes of the world now look into space, to the moon and to the planets beyond, and we 
have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a hostile flag of conquest, but by a 
banner of freedom and peace. We have vowed that we shall not see space filled with 
weapons of mass destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and understanding.... 
 
— John F. Kennedy, speech at Rice University, September 12, 1962 
 
A. OVERVIEW OF U.S. ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
 The strategic importance of ASAT weapons is based mainly upon the value that 
these systems have been designed to counter. Since their initial inception, military 
satellites have grown to become a critical tool to provide the reconnaissance, 
communications, missile warning, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) that are vital to 
achieving mission success on the battlefield. As the use of military satellites grew from 
the provision of mainly reconnaissance and communications to an ever increasing 
number of force enhancement and support areas, the use of satellites has become 
increasingly important to the successful operation of the armed forces. With an increased 
reliance on satellites, the negation of an adversary’s satellites has been a subject 
investigated extensively by the major space-faring powers. 
 Although the history of U.S. ASAT system development dates back in origin to 
1957, it was not until the 1964– 1975 timeframe that a minimally operational system was 
employed.38 Following a short detente period during the Carter administration, the 
United States resumed testing with an aircraft-launched ASAT during the late 1970s into 
the mid 1980s. As space technology continued to evolve, the United States investigated a 
series of different options to negate Soviet satellites. Following a long moratorium on 
space weapons testing, the DoD destroyed a malfunctioning reconnaissance satellite in 
February 2008 and successfully demonstrated that it maintains an ASAT capability for 
LEO satellites in its current arsenal. 
                                                 
38 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy 1945–1957 (Cornell, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1984), 19. 
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  This chapter examines how the pursuit of a particular school by successive 
presidential administrations has driven U.S. space policy and the impact of that space 
policy on the military’s ASAT technology development. The emphasis within this 
chapter is on the development of the major weapon systems and the role that emerging 
technology has played in stimulating a space arms race. This chapter will also explore 
recent U.S. smallsat development and the utilization of this emerging technology as a 
potential ASAT weapon. 
B.  U.S. ASAT DEVELOPMENT 
 Although ASATs have consistently been an important element of the military’s 
strategy since the first spy satellite contracts were awarded in 1956,39 the primary goal of 
President Eisenhower’s nascent space policy was to legitimize the use of satellites for 
peaceful purposes to include reconnaissance.40  As described previously in the literature 
review section, the sanctuary school believes in the use of space as a means to enhance 
national security. The militarization of space was initially a consequence of the Cold War 
rivalry with the Soviet Union and the desire to peer within the closed Soviet society. The 
U.S. space policy during the late 1950s resulted in not only the covert development of the 
umbrella satellite program WS-117L as the foundation for the Corona and Satellite and 
Missile Observation System (SAMOS) national reconnaissance satellite programs, but in 
the eventual rationale for the military to explore ASAT systems.41  
 By November 1957, each of the individual services had recognized the growing 
strategic importance of space and proposed the development of ASATs in one form or 
another. The various ASAT research programs became a valuable safeguard against 
hostile Soviet action and established a U.S. space policy of hedging that still exists today. 
The U.S. Army Air Force first began investigating the possibility of satellites as early as 
1946 and employed the research group Project RAND, then a part of Douglas Aircraft, to 
                                                 
39 Jack Manno, Arming the Heavens: The Hidden Military Agenda for Space, 1945–1995, (New York: 
Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc. 1984), 142. 
40 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 93. 
41William E. Burrows, Deep Black, Space Espionage and National Security (New York: Random 
House, 1986), 80. 
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examine “the potential of earth-orbiting satellites.”42 RAND’s seminal report provided an 
engineering analysis that assessed the required propulsion, rocket staging, optimum 
design parameters, and trajectories to design a man-made satellite.43 The services and the 
newly formed U.S. Air Force (USAF) in particular, continued to investigate the use of 
satellites to augment their existing U-2 aircraft reconnaissance capability and many of 
these early evaluations further explored the various means required to disable satellites.44 
 Many of the USAF’s initial paper assessments of ASAT systems investigated the 
employment of the technology of the time to detect, identify, intercept, and, if necessary, 
destroy adversarial satellites. To disable a satellite, first required the ability to detect and 
track a new satellite among the thousands of objects in orbit. The next step required the 
characterization of the satellite’s functionality and capability to assess the satellite’s 
mission. Following characterization, an ASAT system would then require the ability to 
intercept a target and the means to disable or destroy the satellite. The complexity of this 
process led senior DoD leaders to explore a whole range of ASAT options to include 
ground-launched, ship-launched, air-launched, and satellite interceptors and eventually to 
the development of several significant ASAT programs.45 
1. Early U.S. ASAT Programs 
 The first of multiple ASAT programs was initiated in 1958 by the Air Force’s Air 
Research and Development Command (ARDC) and examined the brute force method of 
exploding nuclear weapons in space to disable satellites. The first test program was called 
Project Argus and began in September 1958 with the primary intent to “examine the 
possible blackout effects of high-altitude explosions on radars and communication 
links.”46 Although the test was chiefly focused on studying the scientific findings of 
atmospheric nuclear explosions, the results from three successive explosions were later 
                                                 
42 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 85.  
43 See “Preliminary Design of an Experimental World Circling Spaceship,” Report No. SE: 11827, 
Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., Santa Monica Plant Engineering Division, Contract WBB-038, May 2, 
1946 for a detailed and predictive discussion of the use of satellites.  
44 Stares, The Militarization of Space, 106. 
45 Manno, Arming the Heavens, 142. 
46 Stares, The Militarization of Space, 107.  
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incorporated into subsequent Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) studies on 
satellite interception.47 Additional high-altitude nuclear testing codenamed Project 
Fishbowl occurred throughout the summer and fall of 1962 above Johnston Island in the 
South Pacific. The series of tests were designed to be several orders of magnitude greater 
than the Project Argus trials and, after two unsuccessful attempts, resulted in the 
successful explosion of a nuclear warhead at an altitude of 250 miles and a force of 
1.4 megatons.48 The nuclear explosions caused the embarrassing disablement of seven 
operational satellites but did, however, yield valuable information on the inherent 
vulnerability of satellites to the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) of nuclear explosions. The 
tests were a major driver in restarting test ban treaty negotiations and in the eventual 
signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, and the investigation of ASAT systems 
continued along more conventional means.     
 The first exclusively designed ASAT system was the air-launched ballistic missile 
designated Project Bold Orion.  This program was initiated in March 1958 and added a 
second- stage capability to the existing single-stage missile to enable the system to be 
used as a satellite intercept demonstration.49 The missile was launched from a USAF B-
47 aircraft and was designed to intercept the Explorer IV satellite at its apogee above 
Cape Canaveral in October of 1959.50 The test successfully completed its test objectives 
as the missile passed within four miles of its intended target.51 Project Bold Orion’s 
accomplishment encouraged additional studies to be pursued although the Air Force’s 
efforts now favored ground based launches and mandated inspection, rather than the 
disablement or destruction of the targeted satellite.  
 The U.S. Navy (USN) conducted its own investigation of ASAT capabilities with 
the initiation of the service’s “Early Spring” program. As space military author Paul B. 
Stares notes, “Early Spring became an umbrella name for a variety of programs that were 
                                                 
47 U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960, Part 6, 112.  
48 See Manno, Arming the Heavens, 82–85 for a detailed description of the Project Fishbowl series of 
nuclear tests. 
49 Stares, The Militarization of Space, 109. 
50 Ibid.  
51 See “ALBM Comes Close to Satellite Path,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 71, no.18 (2 
November 1959): 33, for a detailed description of the ASAT test, objectives, and results.   
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put forward by the Navy between 1960 and 1964.”52  The principal idea behind many of 
the USN program variants was based on the concept of a Polaris submarine launched 
ballistic missile (SLBM) that could be inserted into the orbit of the intended satellite 
target, seek out the target through terminal guidance, and then disable it in orbit.  The 
Polaris SLBM was a non-nuclear option and afforded greater flexibility to target satellites 
at varying inclinations. One significant drawback was that the system did not allow for 
any inspection of the hostile satellite prior to its disablement.53 This perceived USN 
program weakness helped spur USAF research efforts in the direction of an on-orbit 
inspection capability.    
 The first full-scale U.S. ASAT system is generally credited to the Satellite 
Interceptor (SAINT) project that had originated as a paper study conducted by ARDC in 
1956.54 After more than three years of study, a developmental contract was awarded to 
the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) in the spring of 1961 to develop SAINT. 
Although the program was given DoD permission to proceed, the program was primarily 
viewed by policy-makers as strictly an inspection system that could provide additional 
information to ground-based assets.55 The highly ambitious and technically challenging 
program was comprised of three distinct phases: 
Phase 1—Demonstration of a prototype spacecraft that could rendezvous with and 
inspect an unidentified satellite of one square meter radar cross-section in an orbit 
up to 740 km altitude.  
Phase 2—An automated vehicle that could make multiple orbital changes and 
rendezvous and inspect satellites up to 1850 to 7400 km altitude.  
Phase 3—An anti-satellite vehicle that would not only inspect but destroy enemy 
satellites.56  
 RCA envisioned the SAINT project to be comprised of a ground station for 
command and control (C2) operated from Colorado Springs, a launch vehicle consisting 
                                                 
52 Stares, The Militarization of Space, 110.  
53 Curtis Peebles, Battle for Space (New York: Beaufort Books, 1983), 81–82. 
54 Stares, The Militarization of Space, 112. 
55Ibid., 58. 
56 Encyclopedia Astronautica, “SAINT,” (n.d.), http://www.astronautix.com/craft/saint.htm. 
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of an Atlas-Agena first and second stage rocket, and a final stage vehicle from which on-
orbit inspections would be conducted.57 The program was originally budgeted for 
19 vehicles at its inception with a total programmatic cost of $1.28 billion and a full 
operational capability (FOC) by the summer of 1967.58 The DoD directed the Air Force 
to use its own internal funding for the project but the lack of strong political and financial 
support, in addition to the program’s complex technical challenges, eventually led to the 
program’s cancelation in 1962. The on-orbit inspection of foreign satellites had 
significant political implications and improving electro-optical ground based systems 
were eventually deemed a more efficient and politically expedient option for satellite 
identification and characterization. 
 In direct opposition to Eisenhower’s disdain for space weapons, the Air Force 
moved to lay claim to a larger responsibility of military operations in space with its high 
ground approach to space.59 Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White stated on 
November 29, 1957, that “whoever has the capability to control the air is in a position to 
exert control over the land and seas beneath.”60 Air and space were perceived as one 
continuous medium and the service’s view at the time was that the Air Force should have 
operational control over all space assets to ensure air superiority. The on-going 
investigation of ASAT systems led scientists to explore several options in addition to 
inspection, which by the technological standards of the day seemed rather exotic in 
nature.  One proposal investigated the use of either lasers or masers to disable the optical 
sensors of adversarial satellites. Funding for this research remained low due to technical 
skepticism of the weapon’s near-term development prospects and the projects failed to 
overcome many of the existing technical hurdles leading to their termination.  
 With the change to the Eisenhower administration, the Air Force was encouraged 
by the campaign promises of President Kennedy to close the perceived missile gap and 
                                                 
57 Ibid.  
58 See Stares, The Militarization of Space, 112–117 for a detailed discussion of the SAINT program 
objectives and funding. 
59 Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space, 14. 
60 Stares, The Militarization of Space, 48. 
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actively pursued the X-20 Dynasoar manned space vehicle as a potential ASAT system.61 
Dynasoar faced a number of technical hurdles and an unclear mission for manned  
space operations, but was given permission to proceed in 1962. The Dynasoar project 
 had its origins in studies conducted by the German Luftwaffe during WWII and, if 
successful, would allow “strategic reconnaissance, satellite inspection/interception, and 
intercontinental bombardment.”62  The program consisted of a manned orbital hypersonic 
glide vehicle that could be launched into space and “bounced off” the atmosphere. The 
project was envisaged of as having three separate and distinct phases: 
 
Phase 1—Demonstration of a research vehicle that would undergo 20 air-
launched test flights from a modified B-52 starting in June 1963, followed by five 
unmanned sub-orbital test flights, boosted by a Titan I rocket, starting in 
November 1963. The final part of the first stage would involve eleven manned 
flights from Cape Canaveral, landing at a variety of different locations.  
Phase 2—A vehicle to gather data on operations in orbit and eventually result in a 
reconnaissance vehicle that would also have the ability to inspect satellites.  
Phase 3—An operational system that could perform reconnaissance duties and 
would be able to act as an intercontinental nuclear bomber.63 
 
The Dynasoar project fell victim to competition with other ongoing ASAT efforts and to 
the Gemini program, which was simultaneously pursing similar rendezvousing and 
maneuvering objectives for NASA’s manned space program.64  The potential offensive 
 
 
                                                 
61 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 106. 
62 See Clayton K.S. Chun, “Viewpoint: Expanding the High Frontier: Space Weapons in History,” 
Astropolitics, 2, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 63–78, for a detailed description of the German Luftwaffe weapons 
production.  
63 See The Spyflight website, “Boeing X-20 Dyna-soar,” (n.d.), 
http://www.spyflight.co.uk/dynasoar.htm for a detailed description of the program and its history. 
64 Roger D. Launius, “Introduction: Episodes in the Evolution of Launch Vehicle Technology.” in To 
Reach the High Frontier: A History of U.S. Space Launch Vehicles, ed. Roger D. Launius and Dennis R. 
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weapon faced opposition from several DoD officials and funding competition from 
civilian space efforts that resulted in the project’s termination in December 1963 by 
Secretary of Defense McNamara.65  
 Despite the significant shift in financial and political support to NASA, the DoD 
continued a hedging policy of developing an ASAT capability with its development of 
Program 437. In January 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara stated “that the Soviet 
Union may ... soon achieve the capability to place in orbit bomb-carrying satellites” and 
that the United States must be prepared to counter this emerging threat.66 The gravity of 
this situation moved the Kennedy administration from adhering to the sanctuary school of 
thought and to concentrate as well on the survivability of national space assets that the 
DoD was beginning to rely on in ever greater numbers.  
This change to national space policy and the emerging Soviet orbital threat 
prompted the U.S. Army to investigate the use of the Nike Zeus nuclear missile as a 
means to track and intercept targeted adversarial satellites. The commonality of 
antiballistic missile (ABM) and ASAT technology provided the Army with a limited 
ASAT capability that gave rise in 1962 to the highly secret program codenamed Mudflap, 
which was later changed to be called Program 505.67 The missile was conceived as a 
three-stage solid fuel rocket with an overall ASAT range of close to 150 miles in altitude 
that could carry a nuclear payload of close to 400 kilotons in yield.68 Based on the 
scientific findings on the Fishbowl Series tests, the warhead would be detonated within 
close proximity of the targeted satellite and would rely upon either the resulting 
explosion to destroy the satellite or on the effects of secondary radiation production to 
disable the target. The program met multiple testing objectives to include interception of 
thirteen reentry vehicles and one specially equipped test body but was perceived to have 
several operational deficiencies.69 McNamara canceled the program in 1966 over 
                                                 
65 The Spyflight website, “Boeing X-20 Dyna-soar,” (n.d.), http://www.spyflight.co.uk/dynasoar.htm. 
66 Quoted from U.S. Congress, Senate, Soviet Space Programs 1962–1965, 75.  
67 Stares, The Militarization of Space, 118. 
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concerns about the system’s small throw weight, its acquisition radar, and an overlapping 
capability with an existing USAF program that had both a greater range and payload 
capacity. The cancellation of Program 505 was to signal the end of the Army’s 
involvement with ASATs and to signal the Air Force’s primacy in the pursuit of space 
weapons.70     
 Following the conclusion of the Fishbowl test results in late 1962, the Air Force 
began its own investigation into the use of ABM technology as the foundation for an 
ASAT weapon. Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert received approval from the 
Secretary of Defense to proceed and bring to an operational capability the project now 
known as Program 437. The project was designed with the goal of demonstration of the 
capability of satellite interception and destruction and quickly became one of the Air 
Force’s highest priorities.71 Codenamed Squanto Terror, Program 437 had the 
operational objective to launch “a simulated nuclear warhead up to 700 nautical miles 
high and up to 1,500 nautical miles down range.”72 The intended targets for the program 
testing consisted of either dead U.S. satellites or orbiting debris left over from previous 
launches. Program 437 had several advantages over Program 505 that made it attractive 
to senior policymakers to include improved range and ceiling, a higher throw weight, and 
an all Air Force launch crew at the ground station.73 The first of four demonstration tests 
took place in February 1964 and the program was declared Full Operational Capability 
(FOC) in June 1964 when two missiles were placed on alert at the launch complex on 
Johnston Island.74  From 1964 until 1970, the program completed 16 live firings but 
under the convention of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) signed in 1963, did not 
launch any nuclear warheads.75 Although the Soviets commenced with ASAT testing in 
1968, the 
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Nixon administration’s changing defense priorities and a lack of Thor rockets resulted in 
Program 437 being reduced from 24 hours operational readiness to 30 days in 1970 and 
its subsequent cancelation in 1975.76  
 Although Program 437 had been given official permission to proceed, the 
Kennedy administration was simultaneously negotiating the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) in October 1963. The resolution called upon states to 
refrain from placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space and 
laid the groundwork for the negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967.77 This 
diplomatic initiative curtailed the military’s view of space as the ultimate high ground, 
which could be dominated by the placement of nuclear weapons in space, while at the 
same time allowing the continued use of reconnaissance satellites in support of the 
sanctuary school of space.78  
 With President Johnson’s assumption of the presidency, the administration’s 
space policy continued along the same dual-track as that of his predecessor. The United 
States continued to pursue ASAT development as a hedge against possible Soviet 
abrogation of existing arms control while continuing to seek arms control treaties to 
enhance national security.79  In the run up to his 1964 presidential reelection, President 
Johnson publicized the government’s pursuit of the ASAT systems Programs 437 and 
505 but emphasized their use as strictly a defensive option against Soviet weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) in space.80 In 1966, the Soviet Union began testing of the 
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) that called for nuclear-tipped 
intercontinental ballistic missile to be placed in an orbit which would allow it the ability 
to approach the United States from multiple directions to elude early warning radar 
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systems.81 Despite this emerging Soviet threat, DoD officials moved to strengthen only 
their ground radar capabilities and the U.S. Senate ratified the OST in April 1967.  
 In 1969, newly elected President Nixon founded a Space Task Group under his 
vice president to review the national space program and provide options for future 
development. The result was that the DoD would embark only on military space 
programs that could be accomplished cheaper than through terrestrial means.82 The 
ongoing conflict in Vietnam and the rising defense expenditures in Southeast Asia 
resulted in significant cuts to the space defense budget. During Nixon’s administration, 
the ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems and the 
Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms in 1972 provided restrictions on 
the use of ASAT systems. These agreements were pursued to strengthen strategic 
stability through the verification of arms control measures by national technical means 
(NTM) and signaled a shifting of the government from an emphasis on space control 
doctrine back to the sanctuary school of thought.83  Although a nuclear warhead ASAT 
provided a credible deterrent for potential Soviet nuclear orbital bombs, its use would 
have been deemed “excessive” for any other space weapon. The FY 1980 Arms Control 
Impact Statement on Space Defense summed up Program 437’s existence with the 
following comment: 
The Johnston Island system was initially a response to Soviet threats to 
deploy orbital weapons of mass destruction. The system was deactivated 
because this threat was never deployed (and the Outer Space Treaty 
prohibited its employment), and because a low altitude [explosion] would 
probably damage U.S. satellites as well as the targeted Soviet Satellite.84 
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2. U.S. ASAT Programs in the 1970s–1980s   
 Although Program 437 remained operational until 1975, with the reduction in 
readiness in 1970 and the cancelation of the crew exercises, the program ceased to be a 
credible deterrent several years before its termination.85 Given the political implications 
of a nuclear explosion in space, it was not likely that the United States would have 
chosen to employ a nuclear weapon against Soviet space systems as a primary option. 
Research on alternative non-nuclear options began in the late 1960s and resulted in the 
introduction of miniature homing vehicle (MHV) technology as a prime area of ASAT 
technology study in 1970.86 The MHV technology consisted of a “cluster of rockets 
surrounding eight cryogenically cooled infra-red telescopes.”87 The MHV was a kinetic 
kill vehicle (KKV) that relied upon being maneuvered into the vicinity of its intended 
target, tracking the target with its sensors, and then intercepting and ramming the targeted 
satellite. Orbital dynamics allowed the MHV to destroy the targeted satellite without the 
need of carrying an explosive payload. Although the technology showed great promise in 
the early 1970s, the program was shelved for the time being during the thawing of 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the resulting detente 
between the two space powers.   
Following the Watergate scandal and the resignation of Nixon, President Ford 
assumed the presidency and in 1975 convened the Slicther Panel on the military 
application of space to assess the threat of Soviet disruption to U.S. satellites. The report 
warned of a growing national dependence on satellites that were defenseless and 
susceptible to countermeasures.88 These findings prompted Ford’s administration to 
commission a second panel to assess satellite vulnerability and to consider the need for an 
ASAT program.89 The Buchsbaum Panel as it was called concluded that an ASAT 
capability would not significantly enhance the survivability of space assets because the 
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United States was far more dependent on satellites than the Soviet Union.90 An 
indigenous capability, however, could be used as an effective bargaining chip to pursue 
an ASAT arms control agreement with Soviet leadership. Ford’s administration up to this 
point had pursued restraint in the development of ASATs and had viewed the 
cancellation of Program 437 as a clear signal to the Soviets that an arms race was in 
neither party’s best interest. The recommencement of Soviet ASAT testing in 1977 
prompted the Ford administration to once again pursue the development of an ASAT 
system. 
 After the election of President Carter, the new administration proposed in March 
1977 to the Soviet Union a restriction on ASAT capability and development. The 
administration pursued a dual-track space policy approach and simultaneously authorized 
the development of an ASAT system while pursing negotiations. The administration felt 
that the an air-launched system such as the MHV that was being developed by the Air 
Force could be used as an important bargaining chip during arms control talks. High-level 
DoD interest in 1978 led policy-makers to define U.S. ASAT requirements and resulted 
in a series of studies to examine air-launched systems as an alternative weapons platform. 
The Air Force evaluated multiple launch platforms and determined that the F-15 aircraft 
was the best choice based upon its operational ceiling and rapid rate of ascent.91 The F-
15 had the added advantage of operational flexibility to attack target satellites at multiple 
inclinations in LEO and no longer had to rely upon the target to pass overhead in orbit. 
The Air-Launched Miniature Homing Vehicle (ALMHV) consisted of a two-stage 
missile launched from an aircraft that relied upon the missile to track its intended target 
and on the kinetic energy of the collision to kill its intended target.92  
 Other ASAT options were explored during the 1970s with the USAF, USN, and 
Army as well as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) all 
investigating the use of directed energy weapons (DEWs) as potential weapons for space 
defense. The various research activities resulted in a group of highly prominent physicists 
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to gather together in 1978 at the request of DoD to assess the feasibility of particle beam 
weapons (PBWs). The committee’s report recommended continued research in five key 
technology areas and funding was authorized for PBWs.93 A second completed study just 
two years later by a senior advisory board concluded that PBWs were a “twenty-first 
century phenomenon”94 and the funding in this area was subsequently withdrawn, ending 
this research for the time being.  
 By way of contrast, research into high energy ground-based lasers during this 
time period met with much greater success. In FY80, funding was authorized for the 
development of a hydrogen fluoride laser, a laser optics system, and a laser acquisition, 
pointing, and tracking device.95 The USAF and USN continued to pursue their own high-
energy laser acquisition programs and tested against multiple targets. Although ground-
based lasers were highly dependent on clear atmospheric conditions for efficient 
transmission, laser ASAT systems exhibited several distinct advantages over KKVs to 
include almost instantaneous effect at the speed of light, delayed attribution of the 
satellite disablement, the option of reversible effects, and the diminishment of orbital 
debris.96  
 The ensuing invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in December 1979 
ultimately pushed the idea of ASAT arms control to the backburner between the two 
countries. ASAT technology had been developed by the Air Force to be used as a 
bargaining chip with the Soviets for arms control measures but, with the change in 
political climate, it once again emerged as a viable tool for national defense space policy.  
The Carter administration during its tenure followed the school of survivability by 
pursuing research and development into ASATs to protect space assets. Although the 
policymakers pursued space weapon systems in no small part as a bargaining tool for 
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negotiations with the Soviets, the political events of the day did not allow the realization 
of the Carter administration’s goal of an arms control treaty. 
 In 1981, President Reagan was elected to office and his administration performed 
its own assessment of space policy. In a departure from the Carter administration which 
had promoted ASAT arms control, the Reagan administration rejected arms control 
initiatives and called for the continued study of ASAT arms control options.97 A notable 
shift in the rationale for ASAT development was articulated by the White House in that 
the “primary purpose of a United States ASAT capability are to deter threats to space 
systems of the United States ... [and to] deny any adversary the use of space-based 
systems”98 The new administration now placed an increased emphasis on deterrence and 
the utilization of U.S. ASAT systems to counter any Soviet ASAT capability. The 
renewed interest in weaponization resulted in the renewed testing of the air-launched 
MHV in 1983 and additional research and development into additional ground-, air-, and 
space-based laser weapons systems. The Reagan administration’s space policy closely 
followed the space control school of thought and in many ways was a complete 180 
degree reversal of Eisenhower’s view of the sanctuary of space and its use for only 
peaceful purposes. The role of space superiority became the foundation of the Reagan 
space policy with the potential use of ASATs being a key aspect of the policy.99 
 With the administration’s renewed interest in ASAT systems, the ALMHV was 
tested twice in 1984 against specific targeted points in space that did not contain any 
orbital bodies.100 In September 1985, the interceptor was launched against an aging 
Solwind solar observatory payload, which was orbiting at an altitude of 550 km. The test 
was successful; however, the resulting collision produced more than 800 pieces of debris 
greater than ten centimeters that remained in orbit for the better part of the next two 
decades.101 Two more additional trials resulted in successes and, although the Air Force 
continued to press for added development, the Democrat-controlled Congress included a 
                                                 
97 Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space, 17.  
98 Stares, The Militarization of Space, 218. 
99Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space, 31.  
100 Grego, “A History of Anti-satellite Programs,” 6. 
101 Ibid.  
 32 
ban on ALMHV testing in its next budget authorization bill.102 Although the missile had 
several challenging operational constraints to overcome, in the end, the political 
opposition against the ALMV system was firmly entrenched and resulted in the Air Force 
canceling the program in 1987. 
3.  Post-Cold War U.S. ASAT Programs 
 President George H.W. Bush came to office in 1989 under a vastly different 
geostrategic environment than his predecessors. Significant ongoing reforms within the 
Soviet Union prompted a reevaluation of the U.S. space policy, which now emphasized 
elements of science and exploration, national security, and economic growth in the 
administration’s comprehensive strategy for space.103 Bush’s National Space Policy of 
1989 articulated the desire for “freedom of action in space ... through an integrated 
combination of anti-satellite, survivability and surveillance capabilities.”104 The policy 
also called for a development of a comprehensive ASAT capability with an initial 
operations capability (IOC) at the earliest possible date.105 Although the George H.W. 
Bush administration encountered a rapidly changing strategic environment, the policy-
makers continued many of the space policy initiatives begun during Reagan’s presidency. 
Although the end of a Cold War in space was at hand, senior decision makers continued 
an emphasis on ASAT development while maintaining pursuit of a space control 
doctrine.   
 Previous success with DEW ASAT systems resulted in a convergence of 
programs between the Air Force and the Army in the late 1980s. This cooperation 
resulted in the joint Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) program based 
at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, to develop ground-based lasers. With the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the main threat that initiated the program 
disappeared overnight, and Congress banned use of the MIRACL laser as an ASAT 
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weapon in the defense appropriations bills for FY91–95. Although the program was 
formally canceled in 1993, a residual capability was kept alive through pork barrel funding 
as late as FY01.106 With its pricey $40,000 per second operational costs, other ASAT 
systems have been deemed as more cost effective options to pursue.   
 The Clinton administration assumed office in 1993 and promptly reoriented the 
missile defense program that it had inherited from a national to theater missile defense 
(TMD). This refocus resulted in a concentration on ground-based defenses that produced 
an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) designed to intercept an incoming hostile missile 
in space.107 Originally designed as a critical technology for TMD, subsequent 
improvements to the tracking sensors and targeting algorithms provided the EKV with 
the inherent capability to intercept satellites in LEO and to be employed as an ASAT 
system by the military. President Clinton formally articulated his national space policy in 
1996 and merged several defense space programs with civil programs while promoting 
cost savings through the exploitation of the commercial sector.108 A further clarification 
on space policy was released in 1999, when the directive reaffirmed the importance of 
military space to securing national security objectives while reserving the United States’ 
right for self-defense of its space systems.109 Throughout the Clinton administration, 
space was viewed as a low priority with the termination of the National Space Council, 
an executive level review panel for space issues, and relatively low space budgets for the 
military in comparison to previous fiscal year budgets. Although space defense weapons 
such as ASATs were actively designed, the administration never actively pursued an 
operational use of the systems, and the nation’s space policy can be best described as 
following Hays’ survivability school of thought.  
 A profound shift in space policy occurred with the election of George W. Bush in 
the 2000 election. The incoming president ran on a campaign promise calling for a 
national missile defense to keep the nation safe from a small number of missiles in the 
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hands of rogue states110 and moved from a Cold War strategy of deterrence to one that 
now included an operational missile defense. With this goal in mind, the administration 
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, opening the door up for the potential 
weaponization of space. In a clear break from previous policy, the tone of the 
administration’s 2006 National Space Policy assumed a unilateralist approach to the 
access of space through its pursuit of the high ground school of thought. The policy 
rejected new treaties or limitations on American utilization of space, reflecting the fact 
that the United States would no longer be constrained by treaty from testing and 
deploying anti-missile weapons in space.111 In February 2008, the Bush administration 
authorized the destruction of a U.S. satellite based on the publicized rationale that the 
dead satellite’s fuel tank might survive re-entry and could cause a hazardous chemical 
spill upon impact.112 Although the Pentagon provided advance notice to the U.N. of its 
intent and sought to mitigate the debris resulting from its ASAT test, the shoot-down 
generated widespread debate within the international community on the legitimacy of the 
incident. The ASAT test was codenamed Operation Burnt Frost and its success so soon 
on the heels of the Chinese ASAT test in 2007, initiated calls from the international 
community for a future test ban of ASAT weapons.  
 The Obama Administration took office in 2009 and released a revised National 
Space Policy the following year.  The tone of the policy represented a dramatic shift from 
the Bush policy and returned to the language used in the Clinton era and earlier policies. 
Instead of emphasizing a United States-first approach as the Bush Administration’s 2006 
policy had done, the Obama Administration’s policy placed a much greater emphasis on 
international cooperation.113 The policy illustrated the administration’s apparent 
willingness to consider space-related arms control mechanisms. It has remained opposed 
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though to a treaty proposed by the Russians and Chinese on the Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT), calling it “unverifiable.”114 The wording 
and interpretation of the proposed treaty could allow other states to launch direct-ascent 
ASAT technology and other ground-based ASAT weapons, while potentially limiting the 
U.S. ability to deploy defenses if the defense could be defined as a space weapon.115 
Although the Obama administration has advocated for the development of voluntary 
transparency and confidence-building measures to expand international cooperation, the 
progress to date in space security has continued to be painfully slow. The multiple 
advantages offered by smallsats to include: access by users around the globe, COTS 
availability, and the potential for ASAT usage, highlight the pressing need for improved 
international coordination among the space-faring nations.   
C.  U.S. SMALLSAT DEVELOPMENT 
 The breadth of smallsat applications has increased dramatically during the last ten 
years and much of this success is due in part to significant advances in the commercial 
and military satellite sector. Improvements to microelectronics, high efficiency solar 
cells, micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS), and high efficiency motors and 
actuators have resulted in the smallsats becoming an affordable option for launch for 
many of today’s emerging space actors.116 The COTS availability of this technology has 
led the U.S. Government and the DoD in particular to investigate its use as a cheaper and 
more flexible option to conventional space systems. NASA has worked closely with the 
USAF to investigate the potential of smallsat technology for close proximity operations.   
 In 2005, NASA launched the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous 
Technology (DART) as a flight demonstrator to establish autonomous rendezvous 
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capabilities for the U.S. space program.117 The intent of the $95 million program was to 
rendezvous the demonstrator with an Orbital Sciences satellite and to perform close 
proximity operations with the targeted satellite.118 Although NASA had performed 
docking and rendezvous procedures during past missions, these operations had always 
had a “man in the loop” and relied upon astronauts and human judgment to perform 
complex space maneuvers. In contrast, the DART system was reliant on a complex 
mixture of reaction control system thrusters, communications equipment, and the 
Advanced Video Guidance Sensor (AVGS). The AVGS, the mission’s primary sensor, 
collected navigational data to allow the smallsat to perform the maneuvering necessary 
for close proximity operations with a target satellite.119 Reflected laser signals from the 
satellite allowed the smallsat to calculate the correct range and angle between the target 
satellite and its own system. The lasers signals worked in conjunction with the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) to derive an accurate onboard calculation of position relative 
to the satellite that enabled the smallsat to function independently.  
 Following the successful launch, early orbit, and rendezvous phases of the 
planned mission, the DART’ accomplished many of its mission objectives even though 
anomalies were noticed on the ground with the navigation system.120 The demonstration 
had been set up to operate autonomously and did not have the ability to either receive or 
execute uplinked commands, leaving the ground crew no option to correct any anomalies. 
The demonstrator experienced problems with its navigation system throughout proximity 
operations and was unable to calculate accurate measurements of the range to the target.  
The program’s Mishap Investigation Results determined that this error led to a collision 
with the target satellite and eventually the expenditure of the onboard fuel less than 
eleven hours into the mission.121 Although the mission experienced only partial success, 
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the program provided valuable lessons learned on system autonomy and has been an 
important first step for smallsat proximity operations. 
 The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) conducted their own investigation of 
smallsat technology with the launch of the microsatellite class Experimental Satellite 
System 11 (XSS-11) in 2005. Tipping the scales at 100 kg, the smallsat had been designed 
to demonstrate key capabilities, similar to the DART program, to include autonomous 
mission planning, rendezvous, and proximity operations. The mission objectives had 
been designed “to explore a variety of future military applications such as on-orbit 
servicing, diagnostics, maintenance, space support, and efficient space operations.”122 
The smallsat was successfully launched in April 2005 and by the fall of that year had 
accomplished more than seventy-five circumnavigations of the mission’s targeted 
expendable launch vehicle.123 The XSS-11 was able to perform autonomously conducted 
rendezvous and proximity operations with minimal human-in-the-loop interactions and 
illustrated the growing technological evolution of smallsats.  
 The functionality of smallsats continued to expand with the successful launch of 
the Microsatellite Technology Experiment (Mitex) in June 2006. The program consisted 
of two microsatellites weighing approximately 225 kg each with one smallsat built by 
Lockheed Martin and the other built by the Orbital Sciences Corporation.124 The two 
smallsats were flown in geostationary orbit and are part of a classified joint effort 
between DARPA and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL).  Although a limited amount 
of information is present in the public domain, DARPA released a list of the technologies 
the program utilized leading to speculation that the system is capable of proximity 
operations and detailed reconnaissance in GEO.125  Journal articles have linked the 
experiment to the inspection of the recently failed DSP-23 satellite in pursuit of the cause 
                                                 
122“XSS-11 micro satellite,” (n.d.), http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070404–
108.pdf.  
123 Ibid.  
124 Ryan Caron, “Mysterious microsatellites in GEO: is MiTEx a possible anti-satellite capability 
demonstration?,” Space Review, July 31, 2006, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/670/1. 
125 Ibid.  
 38 
of failure for the satellite.126 With today’s existing ground systems, the U.S. Space 
Surveillance Network (SSN) is the only system with the current capability to detect 
smallsats in GEO. This advantage effectively gives the system a stealth-like capability as 
a smallsat technology demonstrator and further symbolizes the attractiveness of smallsat 
technology for military utilization as an ASAT system.  
D. U.S. SPACE SECURITY STRATEGY 
 Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, U.S. space policy has been formed in 
an ever changing and uncertain political environment. The United States and the Soviet 
Union were the two dominant actors throughout the Cold War and the funding for and 
development of technology was often justified by the security competition with the 
Soviets. With the recent trend toward the commercialization and privatization of space 
and launch activities, an influx of new actors are gaining access to space. Technology has 
continued to mature through ingenuity and imagination, advancing from the improbable 
to the possible. Emerging innovations such as smallsats now provide the potential to 
bring game-changing advances as well as threats to the collective space security of 
nations.  
 As examined in the previous section, security threats have often dominated U.S. 
policy, and the focus of the Cold War space policy implemented was based on national 
security. While the Clinton administration moved to maintain the nation’s leadership in 
space activities, space was a low priority for the administration.127 With the election of 
George W. Bush, his administration quickly became focused on the “military security 
concerns and independent action” after the horrific events of 9/11.128 The unilateral 
approach of the administration became a significant barrier to international cooperation, 
and the ever tightening export controls on space technology of which “95% has been 
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estimated to be dual-use,” became a regulatory nightmare.129 Technology became viewed 
as a panacea and a “robust science and technology base” was a cornerstone of the space 
policy goals.130 With the continued emphasis on technology development, such as 
smallsat systems, and the reliance on military power through Operation Burnt Frost, the 
Bush administration might have underestimated the degree to which U.S. capabilities are 
perceived as threats by other space-faring nations.  
 The space policy articulated by the Obama administration expressed a much more 
multilateral approach than its predecessor and reoriented the United States toward 
fostering international cooperation. With the release in February 2011 of the first of its 
kind National Security Space Strategy, the administration turned its attention to a 
strategic environment that is increasingly “congested, contested and competitive.”131 
Rather than focus on state based threats, the strategy outlines its objectives to “strengthen 
safety, stability, and security in space; maintain and enhance the strategic national 
security advantages afforded to the United States by space; and energize the space 
industrial base that supports U.S. national security.”132  Referencing one of the key 
themes of the National Space Policy, the strategy emphasizes the “building (of) coalitions 
of like-minded space-faring nations”133 and the implied establishment of institutional 
norms.134 Although reform for export controls are called for, the role of counterspace 
technologies such as ASATs and smallsats remains unclear.135 With the adoption of the 
National Security Space Strategy, the Obama administration appears to be sending clear 
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signals concerning U.S. policy toward the recently revised European Union Code of 
Conduct.136 The strategy may eventually serve as a valuable bridge to promote 
transparency and confidence-building measures.  
E.  SUMMARY  
 In many ways, the initial militarization of space occurred as a result of the 
ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union and the desire of the 
Eisenhower administration to gain insight into the closed Soviet state during the Cold 
War. As the military role of space grew to provide a number of unique space utilities to 
the battlefield commander and senior decision makers, so too did the U.S. reliance on the 
services provided from orbit increase tremendously. Although ASATs have been 
developed by the U.S. military as a means to counter the Soviet threat, a series of factors 
to include national interests, financial and technical constraints, and formal agreements 
have influenced each administration’s space policy and ultimately alleviated the need for 
their use.  
 The collective space security environment has changed dramatically since the end 
of the Cold War as a series of new space-faring actors have emerged. Military space 
technology has rapidly matured and the employment of smallsat technology by multiple 
space-faring actors provides a continued challenge to space security.  In this era of 
globalization, the international space community is experiencing new security challenges 
that no longer can be solved unilaterally. The U.S. National Space Policy has undergone 
significant changes during the Obama Administration and the stated goals of the 2011 
National Space Security Strategy express the desire for international cooperation. Chapter 
V will address suggested courses of action for U.S. policy-makers to implement 
regarding the proliferation of smallsats to guarantee the common security of all space 
actors.   
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III. SOVIET/RUSSIAN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
We placed Gagarin and Titov in space and we can replace them with bombs which can 
be diverted to any place on Earth. 
 
— Nikita Khrushchev following the successful recovery of Vostok 2, August 8, 1961137  
 
A. OVERVIEW OF SOVIET ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
 With the launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union ushered a 
surprised world into the space age. Although the Soviets had made tremendous 
technological and scientific advances since World War II, little respect had been granted 
to them by the international community. The Soviets had been viewed as a 
technologically backward country throughout the 1950s while the United States had 
dominated global affairs.138 Basing much of their early work on German rocket design, 
the Soviets successfully produced the SS-6 (or R-7) launch vehicle which quickly became 
the foundation for both the ICBM and space programs. Consolidation of these programs 
promoted the sharing of technology and was the antithesis of the U.S space program, 
which strove to keep distance between the ICBM and space programs.139     
 With the growth of its military space program, the Soviet Union developed and 
operationally deployed a nuclear-tipped interceptor as well as a kinetic ASAT system 
from the mid-1960s until the late 1980s, which was capable of attacking U.S. satellites in 
LEO. The ASAT program began with the testing of a satellite interceptor program in 
1968 that was suspended in 1971 and was just one of a number of new Soviet space 
programs during that era.140 Throughout the 1970s, the Soviet military space program 
once again expanded and in 1976 resumed ASAT interceptor testing after a five-year 
hiatus. ASATs weapons were periodically tested up until the early 1980s as the Soviets 
investigated a series of different options to negate U.S. satellites. Since the fall of the 
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Soviet Union, Russia has maintained a moratorium on space weapons testing, but 
following the recent U.S. and Chinese ASAT tests, the military has announced a renewed 
interest in weapons testing.141 
 This chapter examines the history of both the Soviet and Russian ASAT 
development and the formation of the accompanying space policy since the beginning of 
the space age. The emphasis is on the development of the major ASAT systems and the 
role that the emerging technology has played in stimulating a space arms race. This 
chapter will also explore recent Russian smallsat development and the role that this 
emerging technology could have on arms control and continued ASAT development.  
B. SOVIET ASAT DEVELOPMENT 
 Following the conclusion of World War II, the Soviet Union found itself engaged 
in a struggle of ideologies with the United States for global influence. This race for 
supremacy soon expanded into space and the Soviets took the early lead with several 
significant accomplishments in space to include the first satellite, animal, and human 
being in space. The Soviet space program was originally an offshoot of the state’s nuclear 
weapons program and the early struggle to create ICBMs, which placed the military at 
the very heart of the program.142 Much of the launch technology built for ICBMs was 
modified and used by the space program. This organizational structure greatly benefited 
the space program as it received large amounts of research and development money from 
the Soviet leadership that it otherwise would not have had access to.143   
 As a result of early success and multiple U.S. launch failures, the Soviet Union 
garnered international prestige and moved to cast off the perception of its technological 
inferiority and backwardness.  Unlike the United States, the Soviets chose to exploit 
existing space technology rather than waste time and effort on pursuing the state of the 
art. The Soviet leadership extracted political gains from each successful space event and 
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frequently engaged in political one-upmanship with the U.S. space program.144 The 
politicization of space and the inherent Communist fear of Western motives resulted in 
the Soviet Union becoming a reactive country throughout the 1960s, which in turn 
responded to U.S. policy and technology development.   
 Even though the Soviets had launched the first satellite into space, the Soviets 
quickly fell behind in space exploration and military utilization.145 Although the Soviets 
had a significant advantage in space lift, the United States’ investment in space 
technology started to pay dividends early on. The Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev 
had a vastly different set of national priorities, as the country recovered from the horrors 
of WWII and the loss of 20 million dead. The perceived threat of the United States and 
capitalism in general provided a challenge to the Soviet Union around which the 
population could rally. The fear of American aggression and lack of a capable strategic 
bomber drove the Soviets’ pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which was to 
become the cornerstone and key technology provider for the space program.  
 The Soviet Union’s more limited technical capabilities resulted in the production 
of massive launchers and a much different satellite philosophy than that of the United 
States. Rather than rely upon fewer numbers of complex satellites with longer mission 
duration, the Soviets instead relied upon larger numbers of simpler satellites that had 
much shorter lifetimes to perform the same core set of capabilities. Whereas a typical 
U.S. satellite could be expected to operate several years in orbit, Soviet satellite mission 
durations were often measured in months or days. This dichotomy drove the Soviets to 
develop standardized launch vehicles and satellites designs that were both simple and 
mission-effective.146  
1.  Early Soviet ASAT Development Programs 
 At the very beginning of the space age, the initial goals of the Communist Party 
were to establish a Soviet capability for reconnaissance to “see within the boundaries of 
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sovereign states.” Although this purpose appears to reflect the sanctuary school of space 
power through the peaceful use of space, the Soviet military strategy of the day 
acknowledged “the need to study the use of space and space vehicles to reinforce the 
defense of the socialist states.”147 As the United States started their investigation of 
ASAT systems, the Soviet regime shifted to a survivability school of thought as the 
military leadership looked to protect their nascent space assets. The 1963 version of the 
Soviet Military Strategy articulated the Soviet military’s view on the U.S. DoD’s space 
policy by describing it as “aimed at mastering space for military purposes.”148 The Soviet 
Military Strategy summarized the problem it was facing with the United States as: 
The rapid development of spacecraft and specifically of artificial Earth 
satellites, which can be launched for the most diverse purposes, even as 
vehicles for nuclear weapons, has put a new problem on the agenda, that 
of defense against space devices...149 
 Despite the significant Soviet accomplishments in space throughout the late 
1950s, the Kremlin feared that the West was intent on regaining a perceived loss of 
military superiority and that the U.S. science experiments were really a cover for military 
plans.150 Although the military strategy contained a fair amount of Communist 
propaganda, the document illustrated the Soviet fear of the U.S. development of “space 
vehicles intended for delivery of nuclear strikes” and for “the creation of anti-satellite 
weapons to destroy space vehicles.”151 These perceived threats were part of the security 
dilemma that existed between both countries as each country explored the militarization 
and potential weaponization of space.  What each side feared for space technology 
development was the unknown, and that fear justified the spending of large amounts of 
money to build an indigenous technological base to counter the perceived threat.   
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 Similar to the United States, the Soviet Union began investigating the use of 
ASAT weapons in the early 1960s. The Soviets’ first ASAT system consisted of a basic 
direct-ascent weapon similar to the U.S. programs 437 and 505.152 The ABM-1 Galosh 
had a primary mission as an anti-ballistic missile with a maximum range of 250 km that 
was capable of carrying up to a fifty megaton nuclear-tipped warhead.153 The warhead’s 
yield provided the ABM with a residual ASAT capability, which enabled it to destroy all 
spacecraft out to blast radius of 1,000 km. The indiscriminate explosion would have 
disabled Soviet satellites as well as U.S. targets, similar to what had occurred with the 
U.S. Project Fishbowl testing. The Soviets conducted three nuclear explosions during a 
two week period in the fall of 1962 that were of intermediate yields, but stopped testing 
shortly thereafter. The launcher’s limited altitude and the unknown nuclear effects on the 
atmosphere from large nuclear warheads prompted Soviet leadership to forgo the 
operationalization of this weapon system. The ABM-1 Galosh provided the Soviets with 
a rudimentary nuclear ASAT capability to counter early U.S. reconnaissance satellites in 
the event of hostilities, but was abandoned for more precise weapon systems. 
 When the Soviet military started its research into an ASAT interceptor, there were 
several marked differences between their approach and the SAINT system that had been 
proposed by the United States. Unlike its counterpart, the Soviet version was meant to 
destroy important hardened spacecraft in LEO, rather than rendezvous and inspect. The 
concept of operations for the Soviet version was known as “the hot metal kill” and called 
for the detonation of an explosive device in the near vicinity of the targeted satellite, 
which then spread a spherical cloud of shrapnel toward the target.154  The technique for 
disabling or destroying the satellite had the advantage of allowing the Soviets to avoid 
using nuclear weapons and of selectively targeting satellites. This system had the 
disadvantage though of requiring the ASAT to be within a one-km blast distance for the 
shrapnel to hit its target and the kill to be successful.  
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 The development of what would become the first operational Soviet ASAT 
weapon was conceived in 1959 and began in 1961 under the program name, Istrebitel 
Sputnikov (IS), which translates as “destroyer of satellites.”155  The IS system eventually 
won out over the other systems in development because of the simplicity of its technical 
approach, which used a large fragmentation charge requiring far less precision than the 
other techniques. The IS system utilized the Korolev R-7 rocket and was capable of 
putting a 1,400 kg payload into a 300 km LEO orbit.156 The first test was launched 
November 1, 1963, and demonstrated significant mobility through its extensive use of 
maneuvering thrusters. The vehicle transferred from an orbit of 592 km by 339 km to a 
final orbit of 1,437 km by 343 km, illustrating a significant competence to be able to 
change both altitude and inclination.157 The next test in April of 1964 performed a 
similar set of orbital maneuvers in its flight path.  The flight testing demonstrated a 
significant rendezvous and docking ability and was both an important precursor of later 
manned Soviet spacecraft and a critical building block for the follow-on satellite 
interceptor.  
As a result of the increasing Soviet competence, the U.S. DoD closely monitored 
Soviet space activity to assess rendezvous docking proficiency.158 In August 1962, the 
Soviets placed two spacecraft, Vostok 3 and Vostok 4, into space that passed within four 
miles of each other.159 Although the close proximity was due to similar flight paths and 
launch timing, the Soviets demonstrated a rudimentary ability to intercept a target 
spacecraft. The Soviets further tested this capability with a similar exercise conducted by 
Vostoks 5 and 6 during June 1963.  Although the four kilometer range was outside the kill 
zone of an explosive kinetic detonation, the distance would have been easily 
surmountable for a nuclear-tipped ASAT, if the need arose.       
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 Throughout 1962, the military explored the use of manned ASAT systems and 
produced several studies to investigate their viability. The studies researched the use of 
manned spacecraft modules that would be capable of close proximity operations with a 
target satellite.160 The first of these programs resulted in the development of the Soyuz-P 
in 1964. The concepts of operations for the program intended that the Soyuz-P would 
rendezvous with the target satellite and allow the cosmonaut to exit the spacecraft for 
inspection of the satellite.161 Depending on the results of the inspection, the cosmonaut 
would then destroy, neutralize, or bring the satellite back to the Soviet Union for further 
study.162  This approach was quickly rejected by Soviet leadership due to its multiple 
technical complexities and the obvious danger to the cosmonaut. All Soviet satellites 
were equipped with automatic destruct systems to prevent them from falling into enemy 
hands and would detonate if certain parameters were met. Soviet leadership assumed the 
U.S. satellites were similarly equipped and any attempt to interfere with their operations 
would yield very little information and likely lead to the cosmonaut’s death.163  
 A variant of the Soyuz-P yielded the Soyuz 7K-PPK or pilotiruemiy korabl-
perekhvatchik, which is translated as “manned interceptor spacecraft.”164 This version 
had both manned and unmanned options and relied upon inspection of a targeted satellite 
by using on-board equipment. Increasing developmental delays and technical challenges 
resulted in the program’s eventual cancellation.  The Soviet military leadership also 
explored the ideas of a large space mine dispenser, which would carry twelve interceptors 
into orbit and a dormant unmanned space interceptor.165 Both programs had unique 
advantages to make them attractive for their development but cost and technical hurdles 
drove leadership to pursue the kamikaze satellite approach.166 
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 During the 1963–1964 timeframe, the Soviet regime began to place a greater 
emphasis on an operational ASAT capability and established a branch of the military to 
develop and deploy ASATs. The organization was designated the Protivo Kosmicheskaya 
Oborona (PKO) and was established under the Soviet Air Defense Forces with the goal of 
“combating an aggressor’s nuclear attack and his attempt to reconnoiter our country from 
the air and space.”167 The PKO investigated the use of spaceships and satellite fighters to 
counter the perceived imperialist threat and to bring some semblance of order to multiple 
Soviet ASAT efforts that were currently in development within the Soviet military. This 
reorganization brought about a subtle shift in Soviet space policy took place as the 
Brezhnev-led government began to challenge the United States lead in space and moved 
from the school of survivability to now follow a mixed doctrine of space control with 
elements of the doctrine of the high ground school of space.  
The 1968 Soviet Military Strategy outlined the Soviet perspective of space as 
being supported by three distinct goals: creating combat effective space systems for all 
armed service branches; preventing other countries from utilizing space; and developing 
offensive systems to conduct battles in space.168 With these goals in mind, the Soviet 
Union established several space control goals to include: 
1) protection of Soviet tactical and strategic strike capabilities; 
2) support of Soviet tactical and strategic operations; 
3) prevention of the use of space by the enemy for military, political, or economic 
gain; and 
4) unhampered utilization of space assets to further the Soviet system and 
goals.169 
 The intent of this doctrine was to protect Soviet space assets which the leadership 
was becoming more reliant on while simultaneously targeting the use of space by the 
United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners for 
communications and reconnaissance.     
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 As the Soviets continued their investigation of space weapons throughout the mid 
to late 1960s, space became viewed by the Soviet leadership as the ultimate arena to 
deploy weapons. In January 1967, the Soviets recommenced the testing of space weapons 
programs with the launch of Kosmos 139. The launch vehicle for the test consisted of a 
modified SS-9 Scarp ICBM, which, when outfitted with either a fourth stage retrorocket 
or multiple-burn fourth stage rocket, enabled the Soviets to employ their Fractional 
Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS).170 FOBS consisted of a large nuclear warhead 
that could de-orbit into a LEO orbit of 150 km altitude and could approach the United 
States from any direction and below missile tracking radar. The Kosmos 139 test 
illustrated the ability to drastically shorten the warning time of an ICBM by placing it 
into a partial LEO orbit and out of sight of many of the north-facing U.S. ground radars. 
The warhead would be de-orbited with less than one orbital revolution to complete its 
mission or be allowed to remain in orbit until needed, drastically reducing the amount of 
warning time. Although FOBS provided a crucial element of surprise, in reality the 
system had two big disadvantages that precluded its implementation. One drawback was 
that because of its greater need for fuel to maneuver, a smaller warhead had to be used to 
compensate for launch weight management. A second drawback was that the system’s 
trajectory resulted in a larger circular error probability (CEP) that made the system 
effective primarily against only soft military and civilian targets.171  
 Altogether, the Soviets completed sixteen estimated FOBS tests from January 
1967 to the cancellation of the program in August 1971. The continued system testing 
indicates the pursuit of a dual-track strategy, given the fact that the Soviet Union was 
engaged in WMD negotiations in the Outer Space Treaty with the United States 
throughout 1967, when a large number of the early tests were conducted. Sea-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) provided the same type of capability as FOBS and became the 
Soviets’ choice for a more maneuverable nuclear weapon against the United States.172 
Further negotiations between the Soviets and the United States resulted in the Strategic 
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Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), which discussed the allowed number of bombers, 
ICBMs, and SLBMs for both countries but failed to include mention of the number of 
ASATs. As a result of the growing detente with the United States, Soviet leadership 
eventually cancelled FOBS testing and halted their pursuit of ASATs during the early 
1970s.  
 At the same time as the Soviets were testing the FOBS system, the PKO 
continued testing the IS ASAT system in partial response to perceived American ASAT 
programs. Following the launch of Kosmos 185 in October 1967 into an eccentric low 
earth orbit, the spacecraft was then maneuvered into its final parking orbit as an intended 
target satellite. Several months later, Kosmos 217 was launched into a similar orbit as 
Kosmos 185, but Western sensors tracked only debris, suggesting that either a failure had 
occurred or a possible weapons test had occurred. Kosmos 248 and 249 were launched on 
successive days into the same orbital plane in October 1968, and when Kosmos 249 was 
detonated when it flew by the targeted satellite.173 From this test and several successive 
tests during the next three years with varying targets and orbital parameters, the United 
States was able to determine that the Soviets had developed an operational IS kinetic 
weapon system. Five of the seven tests of the Soviet IS system were deemed to have been 
successful by Soviet military experts but more importantly demonstrated the Soviet 
ability to attack a variety of satellites throughout the LEO orbital plane.174 The IS system 
provided the military leadership an alternative to the FOBS platform, but like that system, 
testing was halted in 1971 with the signing of the SALT I accords and a self-imposed 
hiatus.     
2. Soviet ASAT Development in the 1970s—1980s 
 The Soviet Union resumed testing of their ASAT weapon system in February 
1976, with the launching of a Kosmos target from their Plesetsk Cosmodrome 
800 kilometers north of Moscow. The latest series of weapons testing exhibited a new 
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flight profile that caused great concern for military observers.175 This innovative 
approach was nicknamed the “pop up” profile, and consisted of the launching of a target 
first, followed by the launch of an interceptor four minutes after the pass of the target 
vehicle over the launch site. The interceptor was placed into a lower orbit, which allowed 
it to quickly gain on the target and then assume an elliptical orbit to enable interception of 
its target.176 From launch to interception, the Soviets now had an ASAT capability that 
could engage targets in certain orbits within a window of approximately forty-two 
minutes. This short interval allowed little time for any evasive U.S. action and could be 
done surreptitiously outside of U.S. tracking range and observation.  
 Soviet military leadership tested three different variants for the ASAT system’s 
orbital tracking CONOPs to include a fast “flypast,” a slow “flypast,” and the original 
“pop up” technique.177 The military explored the weapon’s ability against several 
different orbital planes to include a medium altitude circular orbit, a highly elliptical orbit 
(HEO), and a target in LEO during the 1978–1982 timeframe with a marginal success 
rate.178 After the final launch of the system in June 1982 ASAT, the Soviets had tested an 
ASAT weapon twenty times during a fourteen-year period. The program provided the 
Soviet military a significant capability against U.S. LEO satellites, but the operational 
range limitations of the ASAT systems kept the geostationary U.S. assets beyond reach.  
 The continued testing during this period may be attributable to several factors to 
include the ongoing political turmoil in the United States, the lack of a SALT II 
agreement, and the beginning of the Chinese space program. From 1972–1975, the 
ongoing Watergate scandal distracted the Nixon administration from the pursuit of a 
SALT II agreement and resulted in the resignation of both the president and vice-
president. This perceived weakening of American political strength and the 
dismantlement of the U.S. Johnston Island Facility in 1975 provided a boost to the 
Soviet’s perceived military posture. At the same time, the PKO feared losing their ASAT 
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capability as a result of a lack of training and the testing may have begun again as a 
Soviet bargaining tool to bring the United States back to the table for arms control 
negotiations.179  
 An additional factor that may have influenced renewed ASAT testing is the 
initiation of the Chinese space program. Soviet ASAT tests were conducted in 1970 
shortly following the launch of China’s first two satellites in spring of 1970. The Soviets 
again resumed testing with the new “pop up” flight profile in 1975 following the launch 
of three subsequent Chinese satellites. Although the Soviet ASAT tests were conducted 
within many of the similar inclinations as the Chinese satellites, a clear linkage between 
the two has been indeterminate since the Soviet launch facilities’ locations and orbital 
mechanics dictate the ASAT system’s range of inclinations.180 The timing of the 
weapons testing though suggests a continuation of the Soviets’ pursuit of space as a 
political tool and a space policy throughout Brezhnev’s leadership that contained 
elements of both of the schools of space control and the high ground. Although the 
military developed both the FOBs and various ASAT systems to be used in the event of a 
space conflict, ultimately, the Soviet leadership’s restraint from employing weapons 
reflected a partial acceptance of the sanctuary school of thought.181  
 The 1984 and 1985 editions of the Soviet Military Power claimed that the ASAT 
systems had been operational since 1971, and more importantly illustrated the importance 
placed on the space weapon system by the Soviet military leadership. The Soviet 
Premier, Yuri Andropov, announced in 1983 a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing, 
which brought dismay from much of the Soviet military establishment, who had become 
dependent on the system as a probable course of action in the event of conflict.182 The 
Soviet Union vowed not to deploy any space weapon as long as other countries refrained 
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as well from employing ASATs.183 Following Mikhail Gorbachev’s assumption of the 
leadership, the IS ASAT system was discontinued as a struggling economy and domestic 
priorities became a higher priority within the Communist Party.   
 Although the IS system had been the foundation of the Soviet ASAT program 
throughout the program’s existence, the military continued the development of several 
new systems in the early 1980s in response to the Reagan administration’s Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI), continuing U.S. ASAT plans, and the U.S. pursuit of the space 
shuttle. These projects included the construction of the Kaskad and Skif ASAT orbital 
stations that were to be armed with both laser weapons and short-range interceptor 
missiles.184 Both platforms had been on the drawing board since 1976 but with the 
continued U.S. pursuit of the SDI program, the military moved forward in development. 
Soviet engineers adapted a compact, one-megawatt carbon dioxide laser that had been 
previously tested on an Il-76 transport aircraft as a weapon against missiles on the Skif 
station. In August 1984, the new spacecraft was approved and designated Skif-D, the “D” 
standing for the Russian word for “demonstration.”185 Skif-D “grew to be almost 131 feet 
long, more than 13 feet in diameter, and weighing 210,000 pounds, more massive than 
NASA’s Skylab space station,”186 and was both incredibly complex and expensive. The 
launch of the system now called Skif-DM for Demonstration Model (which had no 
weapons systems aboard), slipped to early 1987. After reaching orbit, a software glitch 
resulted in the Skif-DM tumbling through two revolutions before heading back into the 
atmosphere, where it broke apart on reentry.187 This lack of success and the program’s 
exorbitant price tag resulted in the cancellation of the system by its opponents.  
 Throughout the mid-1980s, the Soviet military developed the Naryad ASAT 
system to ride aboard a silo-based missile.  The launcher was derived from an existing 
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Soviet UR-100NU ICBM that had been modified to include a highly maneuverable upper 
stage.188 The upper stage would then release several kill vehicles that were capable of 
reaching satellites in GEO, a significant upgrade over the previous IS ASAT platform. 
The interceptor was outfitted with four thrusters which it could use to home in on its 
intended target before switching to an onboard computer for its final approach and 
detonation of its warhead.189 Although the ASAT originally had been envisioned as key 
element of a Soviet equivalent “Star Wars” program, the development of the system 
continued with minimal support, and it was not shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union 
that the system was tested.    
 Although the Naryad ASAT system had been on the drawing board for the better 
part of a decade in response to the development of the American SDI program, the 
program did not undergo its first test evaluation until November 1990. The Naryad ASAT 
was launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome and quickly became the foundation of first 
the Soviet, and later the Russian, ASAT arsenal.  A second suborbital test, that was more 
comprehensive in nature, was completed in December 1991 shortly before the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. Both tests were successful and were conducted on a ballistic 
trajectory to demonstrate the platform’s capacity to use its multiple thrusters in a series of 
orchestrated firings.  Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Naryad underwent a 
final test in December 1994, when the ASAT was launched into orbit.  Although the 
experiment was successful, the task force responsible for the ASAT testing was 
immediately disbanded after the trial, and the program’s operations and oversight were 
officially transferred to the Plesetsk Missile Facility. 
Under Gorbachev’s leadership, the Soviet Union underwent a significant 
transformation to its space policy. Although his Soviet space policy analysts argued for 
pursuit of a sanctuary school of thought policy, the unwillingness of the military to 
abandon ASATs as a fundamental element of its arsenal prohibited the Kremlin from 
fully pursuing this option. With Gorbachev at the helm, the Soviets moved to implement 
policies of Glasnost and Perestroika and to slow the military competition with the United 
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States to focus on increasingly problematic domestic issues.  Although several military 
projects that were in the final stages of development (such as Naryad) were completed, 
many of the high profile space programs that had existed under the previous regimes 
were cancelled. 
3.  Post-Cold War Russian ASAT Development 
 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the new Russian Federation inherited much of 
the leftover Soviet space and ASAT infrastructure and Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi 
promised that Russia would continue to remain a space power.190 The primary challenges 
of the newly emerged Russian Federation were to preserve the nation’s military space 
capabilities which it had inherited from the Soviet Union, while maintaining the facility 
infrastructure necessary to support effective space operations.191 Russia struggled to 
maintain full operational capability and was forced to rely on much of the equipment 
remaining from the deteriorating Soviet arsenal.192 
 The Soviet leadership had been highly dependent on space and developed a 
military space program that grew to rely on reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, 
communications and early warning. With the end of the Cold War, Russia struggled to 
maintain these military capabilities but continued to invest in space even moving to 
pursue the commercialization of space. The first sign of this change began under 
Gorbachev’s leadership when the general secretary moved to break the military’s 
dominance of space and the use of space as primarily a political propaganda tool. 
Although the military continued to maintain and develop ASAT systems, space was 
viewed as a critical enabler to help the crumbling Soviet Union gain entry into high 
technology world markets and signified a shift in Soviet doctrine back to the sanctuary 
school of thought.   The Soviets began to emphasize the scientific side of space 
exploration often at the expense of the military and manned space elements of the Soviet 
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space program. Rather than focus on a continued military space competition with the 
United States, the Kremlin increasingly relied on a space policy of cooperation rather 
than confrontation. 
Although the Russians had acquired the leftover ASAT hardware and plans from 
the Soviet period, the military leadership continued to research multiple approaches.  
During the 1980s, the Soviets had examined the possibility of deploying a third-
generation miniaturized nuclear weapon from their Buran space shuttle, that would have 
a two-fold increase in yield and a hundred-fold reduction in weight from previous 
versions.193 The deployment of nuclear weapon by the Buran shuttle did not complete a 
full orbit and as such did not violate any of the existing disarmament treaties or the 1967 
OST. The project received little political support from the Kremlin and was eventually 
abandoned with the cancellation of the shuttle program in 1993 due to pronounced Soviet 
funding shortfalls.  
 Throughout the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, the military investigated 
several alternative space- and air-based ASAT weapons systems to counter U.S. space 
systems. One air-based option was the development of the Kontakt missile system that 
bore a striking resemblance to the U.S. F-15 delivered ASAT system. The missile was 
carried by a MiG-31 fighter that could destroy spacecraft up to an altitude of 600 km, but 
it too was halted by budget shortfalls.194 Space-based directed-energy weapons were an 
additional area that was researched and partially tested by the military. The research and 
development culminated in Russian cosmonauts firing an electron beam gun at a targeted 
Swedish satellite to examine laser behavior in space in 1994.195 Although the scientists 
made significant technical advances toward creating an operable compact space weapon, 
remaining technical and fiscal challenges ultimately led the military leadership to rely on 
the Naryad system as the mainstay of the Russian ASAT arsenal.  
 During President Yeltsin’s administration, the Russian Federation underwent 
dramatic changes to its space policy as the new state struggled to maintain its space 
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capabilities. Russia curtailed space spending at the start of his presidency but quickly 
realized that space was an avenue to obtain hard currency for the government while 
simultaneously maintaining international prestige. This reasoning led to increased 
cooperation and the sharing of space technology between Russia and the United States 
and to an agreement on the joint development of the International Space Station (ISS).  A 
significant reduction in the number of Russian military and unmanned missions started to 
occur in the mid-1990s as many of space enterprises were on paper bankrupt from a lack 
of government financial support.  Reduced military launches can be attributed to 
diminished funding and to relaxed tensions between the United States and Russia. The 
lack of available state funding forced the space program to become highly 
commercialized to survive and the Yeltsin government to continue pursuit of a sanctuary 
school of thought. 
 The turn of the century saw a new leadership emerge for the Russian government 
under President Putin and a renewed emphasis on space capabilities from a country now 
flush with money from soaring oil prices following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Russia 
regained its leadership in 2000 as the top space-faring nation in terms of number of 
launches per year and became the sole provider for transport to the ISS following the 
Columbia shuttle accident in 2003.196 Putin’s administration called for an aggressive 
revitalization of the Russian military space program, which resulted in the development 
of new launch facilities and of a new series of rockets.197 Although some of the planned 
developments have been canceled or delayed, Russia has been more successful in the 
reinvigoration and reconstitution of many of its early warning, reconnaissance and 
navigation satellites. As satellites reached the end of their mission duration throughout 
the past decade, a lack of timely replenishment resulted in the military experiencing an 
ever-decreasing capability.  Inadequate funding and program mismanagement had led to 
a severe decline in several of the military constellations’ performance even resulting in a 
Russian inability to detect foreign missile launches for a four-month period in 2001.198 
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Recent launches have brought the Russian Glonass navigational system to a fully 
functional status as part of a broader modernization effort of the Soviet-era system.199   
 The Putin administration funneled increasingly larger amounts of money into the 
space budget throughout the mid-2000s and perhaps more importantly provided both a 
short and long term strategic vision for the state in October of 2005. In addition to the 
pursuit of a next-generation manned spaceship, Russia committed itself to build a new 
launch complex at the Plesetsk launch site, to upgrade launch facilities in Svobodnyy in 
the Far East, and to construct a fleet of rockets with a wide range of capabilities.200 
Following the United States and Chinese ASAT tests in 2007 and 2008, Russia has 
noticeably shifted from a sanctuary school of thought back to a space control school of 
policy. Although the system has remained a highly classified program and little 
information currently exists in public, President Putin mentioned “the availability of the 
Naryad system as a potential response to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the anti-
missile defense treaty” in a January 2002 edition of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper.  
 Following the successful Chinese and American ASAT actions in 2007–2008, 
Deputy Defense Minister General Vladimir Popovkin intimated that the Russian military 
was developing anti-satellite weapons in response to U.S. and China conducting the same 
activities.201 Putin’s hand-picked successor, Medvedev, has continued many of the 
former president’s space policies under his current guidance as prime minister, and 
today’s Russian military continues to explore ASAT technology to counter the existing 
U.S. and China space threats. As one of the pioneering space-faring powers, Russia 
continues to be at the forefront of space activities, illustrating the continued need for 
coordination with Russia to affect any effective international cooperation.  
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C.  RUSSIAN SMALLSAT DEVELOPMENT 
 The former Soviet Union was a builder of smallsats and a strong advocate for the 
development and employment of smallsat technology. Throughout the early stages of its 
military satellite development, the Soviets often constructed and deployed 
communication smallsats that had a mass less than 220 kilograms and were based upon a 
robust and dependable design. Although the mission lifetime of the smallsats was 
considerably less than many of its U.S. counterparts, the relative cheaper cost of the 
satellites allowed a faster replenishment rate that was hindered only by Russian launch 
vehicle availability. The dependence on smaller cheaper satellites ultimately resulted in 
the launch of more than 650 Russian Strela military communication smallsats from 1964 
to the present.202 Russia has developed many different sizes of satellites depending upon 
the orbit and mission of the asset, but the smallsat has continued to be a featured element 
of their past and current space system architecture. 
 With the technological advances to satellite electronics, Russia has explored 
increasingly smaller and more capable satellites since the early 1990s. Smallsats provided 
a cheaper and more cost-effective platform for a country that was at the time struggling to 
fund its space enterprises. The Mozhayets Military Space Academy in St. Petersburg was 
one of the Russian educational pioneers in both improving and refining existing small 
satellite design.203  After obtaining several spare Strela communications satellites from 
the military, the students modified the smallsats to test several geodetic and laser 
instruments.204 Following the successful launches of the smallsats, the students received 
valuable experience on the ground C2 systems while operating and maintaining the 
satellites in orbit throughout their missions. Other Russian universities to include the 
Moscow Lomonosov State University have joined in the smallsat development and 
designed a wide array of sensors for missions ranging from space weather to earthquake 
prediction.  
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 During the last decade, Russia has emerged as one of the key leaders in the launch 
of smallsats through the use of its Dnepr rocket. The Dnepr launch vehicle evolved from 
an ICBM that was originally decommissioned (and designated for destruction under the 
START II treaty) into a valuable commercial launcher. The launcher can deliver up to 
4.5 tons of payload into a 200 km circular orbit and has become an affordable and 
popular launch vehicle for insertion of satellites into orbit.205 The first mission of the 
Dnepr flew in December 1999 and successfully inserted a smallsat built by the University 
of Surrey into orbit.206 With sixteen of the seventeen launches successful to date, the 
Dnepr has been used to place more than sixty-five smallsats into orbit for a multitude of 
foreign customers ranging from countries to universities.207 Russia has partnered with 
several countries such as Nigeria to launch their first earth observation smallsat in 2003 
and was instrumental in providing design and construction knowledge, testing, and 
launch and orbital operations experience to the country.208   
 In 2003, the Russians’ military and scientific communities made a concerted 
effort to move to leaner and smaller satellites.209  The cash-strapped space developers 
began focusing on the goal to decrease the size of the satellites by a factor of ten to 
enable significant launch cost savings.210 Technological advances to transponders have 
decreased both their size and the amount necessary to perform essential mission tasks. 
The goal of the satellite designers is to decrease traditional geostationary satellites from 
as much as 3.2 metric tons down to 600 kilograms without losing any capability.211 
Russia’s Federal Space Agency has also shifted focus to design dual-purpose smallsats 
that can provide support to Russian satellite constellations while minimizing design, 
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development, and operational costs.212 The move to dual-purpose smallsat systems 
enables the Russian space community to realize potentially significant cost savings.  It 
has also resulted in the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos) objective to double 
the total number of dual-purpose satellites from fifty to more than one hundred before 
2015.213  
 The increasing interest in smaller satellites encouraged the Russian scientists to 
develop and test a five kilogram smallsat in 2005.214 The smallsat was released from the 
ISS during a four-hour-and-thirty-minute spacewalk by the station’s astronauts and was 
the first step in a series of tests to develop future smallsat operations command and 
control techniques.215 Following its launch, the smallsat orbited the Earth in LEO in 
tandem with the ISS, and included a Globalstar packet data modem within its 
communications payloads.216  The test was successful and was unique because of both its 
small size and from being launched from the ISS.  Smallsats have traditionally been a 
secondary payload aboard launch vehicles, and the launch of the Russian smallsat 
demonstrated a significant new breakthrough. This recent success has encouraged 
Roskosmos to announce plans to build and launch more than twenty smallsats for 
research tasks in the near term.217  
 The recent successful construction and launch of smallsats has led to interest from 
several other countries to partner with Russia. In May 2011, Russia and Israel announced 
an agreement to develop a joint center for the development of smallsats.218 The 
agreement will leverage Israeli surveillance satellite expertise and “aid the fast 
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development of cooperation” between the two space-faring nations.219 Current plans call 
for the mutual construction of several joint communications satellites and a remote-
sensing smallsat.220 Russia has made significant progress in smallsat technology 
advancement throughout the last two decades despite Roskosmos’ struggle for consistent 
financial support. The government’s smallsat heritage and the sustained government 
emphasis on smallsats signify Russia’s leadership in the continued development and 
launch of smallsats during the next decade. 
D.  RUSSIAN SPACE SECURITY STRATEGY 
 The former Soviet Union and the United States competed extensively with one 
another during the Cold War both on and above the Earth. From the earliest days of the 
space age, the Kremlin pursued a dual-track approach to develop military space assets in 
secrecy and simultaneously pursued diplomatic efforts for the peaceful use of space. 
Soviet leadership introduced numerous diplomatic and political initiatives that supported 
the non-weaponization of space, while striving to maintain the state’s strategic parity 
with the United States throughout its existence.221 
 As the Soviet Union broke apart, a newfound sense of cooperation emerged 
between the two nations, as the United States worked closely with Russia to maintain 
space security and to avoid the proliferation of sensitive technology and knowledge.  The 
cooperation between the two countries greatly enhanced the space exploration and 
scientific discoveries of each nation and resulted in the establishment of the ISS along 
with the help of fourteen additional nations. The Russian Federation moved to maintain 
strategic parity with the United States and prevent the costly expenditure of rapidly 
dwindling state funds by passing a Law of the Russian Federation on Space Activities in 
August 1993.222 The legislation opposed the emergence of an arms race in outer space, 
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while the Kremlin pursued negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and 
the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).  Although these discussions 
yielded little actual progress, they continued the former Soviet strategy of pursuing 
diplomatic initiatives to maintain an equal space capability with the United States to 
ensure Russian space security.  
 With the election of President Putin’s administration in 2000, Russia again 
continued a dual-track approach toward its space security. In partial response to U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and President Bush’s plans for a U.S. missile defense, 
Russia introduced a joint working paper that was coauthored with China in June of 2002. 
The paper was presented to the UN CD and contained elements of an international legal 
agreement that would prohibit the deployment of any weapons in outer space.  The 
agreement “would also prohibit the threat or use of force against space objects, a concept 
that would ban anti-satellite weapons, either mounted on aircraft or ground-based.”223 
Although the discussions ultimately failed due to U.S. opposition to a formal agreement, 
President Putin offered in September 2003 to implement a no-first deployment of 
offensive space weapons.224    
 Although Russia pursued several diplomatic limitations on space weapons during 
the early 2000s, Putin’s administration continued its acquisition of military space 
systems.  In October 2005, the Russian government officially released a ten-year space 
plan that outlined the goals of President Putin’s administration from 2006–2015. The 
government’s space plan highlighted the need to “provide space technologies and 
services for the benefits of Russian security, the enhancement of international 
cooperation, and to guarantee access and presence in space.”225 The plan was broken up 
into two, five-year periods, which outlined the planned development and acquisition of 
Russian space systems and technology that the administration plans to invest in. 
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 Further Russian diplomatic initiatives resulted in the introduction in February 
2008 of the draft of the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer 
Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The draft was 
prepared jointly by Russia and China for its consideration by the CD and was an attempt 
by both countries to bridge the gaps of existing legal frameworks. Rather than focus on 
the prevention of an arms race, the treaty’s prohibition of space weapons would have 
precluded an arms race from occurring.  The PPWT was initially well received by the 
international community, but met with resistance from the United States. The treaty 
proposal had several weaknesses that led to its fall from favor  including: the lack of 
prohibition of earth-based ASATS, the vagueness of its language regarding threats or use 
of force, and the challenge of on-orbit verification of what is classified as a “weapon 
system.”226 Given its limitations, the PPWT has nonetheless been an important step in 
maintaining the momentum toward the development of confidence-building measures 
among space-faring nations to lower the risk of weaponization in space. 
E. SUMMARY  
 Since its very inception, the Soviet Union has strongly embraced the 
Clausewitzian philosophy that “war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse 
with a mixture of other means.”227 This philosophy served the Soviet leadership well as it 
emerged from WWII strategically inferior to the United States and unable to face the 
West head-on.  As the Soviets forged ahead to become the first space-faring nation, any 
attempt to separate the military and political goals of the Communist state remained an 
exercise in futility. The Kremlin and military leadership grew to rely immensely on the 
capabilities provided from space and on the international prestige derived from their 
many space accomplishments.  Although ASATs were developed by the military as a 
means to counter the perceived American threat, a multitude of factors to include party 
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interests, financial and technical constraints, and formal agreements have influenced 
space policy and ultimately alleviated the need for their use.  
 Since the end of the Cold War, no other national space program has undergone 
such a dramatic change shifting from a secretive, military-run, state-sponsored agency to 
one which is so highly commercialized and integrated with foreign space programs. 
Under President Putin’s leadership, Russia has made a concerted political effort to restore 
the country’s prestige and rightful place within the international community.228  
Although Russia has been highly active in introducing diplomatic initiatives to avoid an 
arms race in space and the destabilization of strategic parity with both the United States 
and China, the military and Roskosmos have continued to develop and launch smallsats.  
Chapter V will address suggested courses of action for U.S. policy-makers to implement 
regarding the proliferation of Russian smallsats to guarantee the common security of all 
space actors. 
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IV. CHINESE SPACE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
“Over the past few years, China’s space industry has developed rapidly and China ranks 
among the world’s leading countries in certain major areas of space technology. Space 
activities play an increasingly important role in China’s economic and social 
development.” 
 
— The Information Office of the State Council  
White paper on China’s Space Activities in 2011, 
 December 29, 2011229  
 
A. OVERVIEW OF CHINESE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
 With the launch of its ASAT on January 11, 2007, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) became just the third nation to successfully test a ground-based interceptor system 
against one of its own satellites. The ASAT system was launched from a mobile 
transporter- erector-launcher located at the Xichang Space Center and obliterated the 
retired Chinese Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C) polar orbit weather satellite at an altitude of 
approximately 850 kilometers.230 The head-on collision resulted in the creation of a 
debris cloud containing more than 3,200 pieces of NASA tracked objects greater than ten 
centimeters in size and also in an estimated 35,000 pieces of debris greater than one 
centimeter orbiting in LEO.231 The test also brought the world’s attention back again to 
the Chinese space program and effectively demonstrated the nation’s growing political 
agenda, which goes beyond the mere acquisition of military or technical capabilities.       
 Little public information has been available on China’s space program throughout 
much of its lifetime, prompting noted space policy analyst Joan Johnson-Freese to title 
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her 1998 book The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze.232 Although little 
information on the space program was available during the early stages of the Chinese 
space program, a great deal more information has been publicized during the last decade 
which provides valuable insight into the country’s goals to become a leading space-faring 
nation. Although the Chinese space program has often taken its technical cues in the past 
from the United States and Russia, the space program’s development has been heavily 
influenced by the political turmoil of the Mao era and its subsequent role in service of the 
revitalization of the Chinese economy.233 Politics have played a pivotal role in the 
direction of the Chinese space program and thus make it necessary to understand the 
influence they have had on its development to better understand current Chinese 
intentions.234    
 This chapter examines the history of Chinese space and ASAT developments and 
the formation of the accompanying space policies since the beginning of the nation’s 
space program. The emphasis is on the development of the major ASAT systems and the 
role that the emerging technology has played in stimulating a space arms race. This 
chapter will also explore recent Chinese smallsat development and the role that this 
emerging technology could have on arms control and continued ASAT development.  
B. CHINESE ASAT DEVELOPMENT 
 Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union (and later Russia), China’s ASAT 
program interest has been a relatively recent development, rather than an ongoing 
program that quickly followed the launch of its first satellite. With the country’s relative 
late start in developing its space capabilities, China has often relied on other nations, such 
as the Soviet Union and later the United States, the United Kingdom, and others, for 
technical expertise to augment its native proficiency. The nation’s various space activities 
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throughout the past decade are indicative of China’s growing interest in space 
technologies, and its success has been cited “as a testament to their economic and 
technical progress.”235  
The space program began in the late 1950s to enhance its national prestige and 
has evolved to become a major political symbol of modern Chinese nationalism and 
badge of accomplishment for China’s Communist regime.236 China has experienced 
notable success in building an indigenous rocket and launch capability, and achieved 
internal prestige with its recent successful manned spaceflights.  As space activities 
continue to play an important role in China’s economic and social development, a 
thorough understanding of China’s political and cultural climate that continues to 
influence the space program and the development of ASATs becomes increasingly 
important. The impact of politics on the launch of the first Chinese satellite in 1970 will 
be examined to provide insight into the nation’s latest ASAT development and its 
continued political goal to be included among the elites of the space-faring nations.   
1.  Early Chinese Space Program 
 The Chinese space program can trace its lineage back to January 1956 when 
Chairman Mao Zedong proposed the rapid development of the nation’s science and 
technology so that it could reach the world’s most advanced levels.237 Mao’s 
pronouncement spurred the Chinese to negotiate with the Soviet Union later that year for 
the provision of Soviet ICBMs, technical support in the form of one hundred Soviet 
engineers, and the exchange of fifty Chinese graduate students sent to Moscow for 
study.238 Although China eventually received delivery of two copies each of the outdated 
Soviet R-1 and R-2 rockets by January of 1958, the Soviets stonewalled requests for 
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additional technical information and Chinese progress was limited.239 The Sino-Soviet 
split left China to fend for itself and would greatly influence the development of the 
nascent Chinese space program.  
 Following the Soviets’ successful launch of Sputnik Mao formally decided that 
China should have its own satellite and made the satellite program the top priority for the 
Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) in 1958.240 This decision resulted in the formation 
of Group 581 to begin a three-phase plan that consisted of: first developing a sounding 
rocket; then launching a 200 kilogram satellite; and finally, launching a satellite of 
several thousand kilograms.241 The undertaking of such a complex task required the 
establishment of three design academies under the CAS to design and develop the 
satellite and rocket and the marshaling of vast resources to accomplish the ambitious 
goal.  
 Along with this ambitious scientific endeavor, the Chinese government 
simultaneously launched the government initiative called the “Great Leap Forward” to 
bring the nation to the forefront of economic development. Mao’s goals were to turn 
China into a leading industrial power that would be capable of overtaking Britain in the 
production of steel and other products within fifteen years, but instead this overly 
optimistic venture led to widespread famine. 242 The political turmoil severely hindered 
the Chinese CAS goal to complete the first phase of satellite development in time to 
celebrate the ten-year anniversary of the PRC, and Chinese requests for Soviet technical 
assistance were rebuffed.243 Restructuring of the program led to Group 581 restarting the 
program from scratch.  In February 1960, Chinese scientists finally launched a simplified 
two-stage rocket, the T-7M, which weighed 190 kilograms, was 5.3 meters tall, and was 
designed to reach a height of a mere ten kilometers.244 The successful launch of China’s 
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first indigenous liquid fuel rocket kick-started the nascent space program and led to a 
series of additional limited research and development programs in space throughout the 
next several years.  
 While the Chinese were enjoying the successful launching of their T-7M program 
and were reverse-engineering the Soviet-supplied R-2s, the political relationship between 
the Soviets and Chinese continued to crumble.245 The acrimonious split forced China to 
rely strictly on its own resources to develop its proposed family of rockets and as a result 
experienced considerable difficulty. The split left China isolated and also resulted in the 
country shifting its technical focus to military imperatives involving ICBMs, rather than 
the successful launch of a satellite. China’s first attempt to launch a Dong Feng 2 (DF-2), 
the nation’s first ballistic missile, ended in disaster when the rocket crashed just 69 short 
seconds after takeoff in 1962].246 The post-crash analysis determined a series of 
structural problems, which resulted in a significant redesign of the system and seventeen 
more ground tests, culminating with the successful launch of the medium-range missile in 
June 1964.247 The missile’s successful trial also demonstrated sufficient progress to the 
party leadership to justify the Chinese pursuit of a satellite launch. 
 The Committee on Science and Technology for National Defense (CSTND) was 
the agency responsible for developing the ballistic missiles and any effort to launch a 
satellite based upon DF-2 technology required their approval.248 In April 1965, the 
Chinese Academy of Science received approval from the CSTND to being the building of 
a one hundred kilogram satellite that would be launched into orbit no later than by 
1971.249 The CAS plan was accepted with several important conditions: the satellite had 
to be more advanced than either of the United States or Soviet Union first satellites, it had 
to have a longer lifetime, and it had to carry more advanced technology.250 As Kulacki 
and Lewis note in their article on the Chinese space program, “the political ramifications 
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of technical details foreshadowed the difficulties the satellite program would face in the 
coming years.”251 The inability to separate the pursuit of politics and science would 
continue to be a challenge for CAS to overcome, and the satellite was ambitiously 
designed to be outfitted with an instrument package to collect data to aid in the 
development of follow-on systems.  
 Shortly after receiving permission to proceed with the development of the satellite 
program, Chairman Mao initiated another political movement in 1966 called the “Great 
Proletarian Cultural Movement.”252 The Cultural Revolution targeted intellectuals, and 
the chaos caused by the political movement left its impact on the scientific staff in charge 
of the satellite. Although the CAS leadership was partially shielded from the on-going 
purges the “political climate now placed an emphasis on speed and propaganda” for the 
construction of the satellite.253 The mission changed from containing a payload that 
would serve as a valuable building block for long-term satellite development to one in 
which the first few bars of a Chinese folk song would play.254 The satellite was 
successfully launched on April 24, 1970, but was a clear example of how the nation’s 
politics undermined the logical technical progress of the nation’s satellite program.  
 The space policy under Mao’s leadership is challenging to categorize because 
China was concerned primarily with achieving a successful launch capability throughout 
much of his term. After achieving its first successful launch in 1970, the Chinese 
leadership then pursued a sanctuary school of policy throughout the remaining decade 
and throughout the last few years of Mao’s rule. During this time the nation established a 
rudimentary space capability through the successful launch of a satellite equipped with 
scientific instruments and a series of launches for electronic intelligence gathering.255  As 
the Chinese space program continued to move forward after Mao’s death, the nation was 
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to gain valuable experience and technology through its astute partnerships with France, 
West Germany and the United States to gain valuable technical expertise and a more 
solid foothold in space.    
2.  Chinese ASAT Development 
 As Moltz notes in his book Asia’s Space Race, “China entered into the 1990s with 
little discernible expertise in military space.”256 Throughout the next two decades, China 
was able to witness the U.S. exploitation of space during its conflicts in the Persian Gulf 
and started down the road to counter the existing U.S. space supremacy China initiated a 
series of programs to improve its defensive posture, which included the construction of 
three new launch facilities, the improvement of its ground C2 and tracking capabilities, 
the development of a new family of improved reconnaissance satellites, and significant 
navigational and positioning advancements.257 These critical improvements to the 
Chinese military infrastructure greatly enhanced the existing space capabilities of the 
nation and the national prestige of the country. 
 While these programs were in development, the Chinese military also began the 
development of an offensive capability through its investigation of multiple offensive 
ASAT systems. According to U.S. congressionally-released reports, the Chinese military 
had investigated the use of ASATs as early as the mid-1980s, at least partly funded under 
China’s classified 863 Program for High Technology Development.258 It was not until 
2005, however, that the actual first of several tests of the Chinese interceptor system took 
place.259 Although released accounts differ as to whether the Chinese had two or three 
prior trials to the January 2007 event, post-test analysis can determine how the weather 
satellite was destroyed and how capable the Chinese ASAT is.260 
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 At the time of the January 2011 attack, the FY-1C was heading south and the SC-
19 interceptor was approaching at an angle of 346 degrees relative to the orbit of the 
satellite.261 Simple calculations yield a combined interception speed of greater than 
30,000 kilometers per hour.262 Because of the high rates of velocity involved, the 
collision of the two objects can be compared to the “hitting of a bullet with another 
bullet.” With such high rates of speed, the Chinese ASAT would have needed to be 
highly maneuverable to be able to guide itself to the target reaching accelerations nearly 
six times that of gravity.263 Because any decrease in the interceptor’s closing speed 
would make the adjustment for collision easier, the Chinese ASAT would be equally 
effective against higher altitude targets. Given the current known projection of Chinese 
tracking proficiency, it is likely that the interceptor tracked the target in the visible part of 
the spectrum.264 Although the Chinese kinetic ASAT trial was impressive, the system is 
currently constrained within LEO to attack high-value targets only when they are 
illuminated in sunlight. This drawback is not as pronounced in higher altitude orbits 
where satellites are in direct sunlight a much greater percent of their lifetime. The SC-19 
interceptor was reported to have been fired again in January 2010 against a target missile 
as part of a Chinese missile-defense system.265 The successful demonstration represents a 
major strategic advancement in China’s military technology build-up.  
In addition to direct-ascent kinetic kill weapons, the Chinese have been reported 
to be exploring alternative ASAT systems. Throughout September 2006, reports began to 
surface that the Chinese military had investigated the use of ground-based lasers as 
possible ASAT systems against U.S. reconnaissance satellites in LEO.266  A September 
28, 2006 Defense News story reported that China had recently “fired high-power lasers at 
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U.S. spy satellites flying over its territory in what experts see as a test of Chinese ability 
to blind the spacecraft.”267 Shortly after the publication of the story, several high-ranking 
U.S. officials “cast doubt on the severity of whatever occurred and the intent behind it” 
and confirmed that the satellites and their optical sensors were not target nor affected.268 
Ground-based lasers can be used to calculate the orbital parameters of a satellite to a high 
degree of accuracy by reflecting low intensity laser pulses off of the moving body. 
Although the laser events were in all likelihood preparation for the subsequent January 
2007 kinetic ASAT test, the difference between ranging and blinding is simply a matter 
of increasing the laser’s intensity and duration on target. The laser incidents do, however, 
show the potential for China to quickly develop an alternative ASAT weapon if desired. 
A third potential ASAT option that the Chinese have been reported to have 
investigated is the use of smallsats for the disablement of satellites.  A FY04 Report to 
Congress, “PRC Military Power,” discussed in detail the Chinese efforts to develop and 
acquire multiple micro-satellites to augment their remote sensing, electro-optical, and 
radar satellite constellations.269 The report also discussed a January 2001 Hong Kong 
newspaper article claim “that China had developed and ground-tested and would  
soon begin space-testing an antisatellite [ASAT] system described as a ‘parasitic 
microsatellite’.”270 The parasitic smallsat was reported to have been in development by 
the Small Satellite Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Space Technology 
(CAST). The smallsat was reported to have been ground-tested and would have attached 
itself through surreptitious maneuver to enemy satellites during crises and awaited the 
order to disable through electronic interference or explosion.271 Although the claim was 
never substantiated, it did raise concerns about China’s counterspace capabilities, 
research efforts, and the growing interest in smallsats.   
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During the last decade, China has developed a considerable military space 
capability through its development and acquisition of technology, and the signing of a 
number of international agreements with other space-faring nations. These moves have 
allowed the Chinese to significantly advance and upgrade their existing communications, 
reconnaissance, and navigation proficiency. The leadership under Presidents Jiang and 
Hu has also explored the development of substantial ASAT capabilities signifying a 
current Chinese space policy of space control.  It is as yet unclear whether the policy is 
potential build-up for space warfare or a hedging strategy against a U.S. hegemonic 
position in space or regional rival such as India, which has publicly discussed military 
space operations.272 As China continues its expansion of its space capabilities, it has 
taken a clear leadership in the development of smallsats and a more detailed analysis of 
its developmental efforts will be provided in the following section. 
C.  CHINESE SMALLSAT DEVELOPMENT 
 China entered into smallsat development and construction in the late 1990s, and 
has made tremendous advances in smallsat design, fabrication, and operations since that 
time. Much of this success can be directly attributed to the 1998 agreement between 
China’s Tsinghua University and the Surrey Satellite Ltd., which is affiliated with the 
Surrey University in the United Kingdom, one of the leading smallsat development 
companies in the world.273 The 1998 agreement was later extended into a twenty-five 
year joint venture in 1999, which was seventy-five percent owned by the Chinese and 
twenty-five percent owned by Surrey.274 
The joint venture company provided valuable experience for Tsinghua University 
and for the export of dual-use space technology to the Chinese. The partnership resulted 
in the building of China’s first micro-satellite, the Tsinghua-1, which was designed as 
part of a satellite network to monitor natural disasters.275 Weighing just seventy-five 
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kilograms and launched from Russia, the three-axis stabilized vehicle included a GPS 
receiver and multi-spectral camera.276 Following its successful launch, the satellite took 
part in a series of experiments with a later smallsat, whereby each satellite participated 
“in a test of rendezvous and inspection of one satellite by another.”277 The close 
proximity operations of the smallsats were the first of their kind for China and illustrated 
significant advances of the command and control of the satellites. 
 The initial success of the Tsinghua-1 collaboration stimulated widespread interest 
throughout Chinese academia. In 2000, Tsinghua University was given approval to start 
its own nano-satellite program to build on the success of the micro-sat launch.278 The 
university explored multiple designs and successfully launched a twenty-five kilogram 
technology demonstrator four years later.279 Also in 2000, the Chinese Academy of 
Science in Shanghai announced the development of the Chuangxin-1 (CX-1) 
microsatellite. CX-1 weighed in at 40 kilograms and was China’s first experimental 
smallsat for data communications in LEO.280 The satellite was successfully launched in 
fall 2003 and continued to represent a growing trend among Chinese universities to build 
an in-house smallsat capability rather than relying on foreign acquisition.  
Although China started its pursuit of an indigenous smallsat capability, the 
Chinese continued to engage in wide-ranging space development initiatives across civil 
space programs. This engagement resulted in China’s developing a constellation of 
dedicated optical smallsats for participation in a comprehensive space-based disaster and 
mitigation system.281 The smallsat construction was part of an international collaboration 
between China, the European Space Agency, France, and Canada and resulted in the 
manufacture of the disaster monitoring satellite named the Beijing-1 in 2006. The satellite 
                                                 
276 “Surrey successfully launch two more satellites,” Brightsurf Science News, June 29, 2000.  
277 Frank Morring, Jr., “At Surrey Satellite Technology, Small-and-Simple is Beautiful,” Aviation 
Week & Space Technology, June 18, 2001.   
278 Wei Long, “China Microsat Performs Well, Nanosat is Next,” Space Daily, August 22, 2000, 
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/microsat-00u.html. 
279 Craig Covault, “China Surges Again,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 26, 2004.   
280 “Small satellite Chuangxin-1 operates smoothly,” Chinese Academy of Sciences, Dec 18, 2003, 
http://english.cas.cn/Ne/CASE/200312/t20031218_16342.shtml.  
281 Michael A. Taverna, “India, China to expand Earth-Observing Nets,” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, October 29, 2001. 
 78 
weighed 166 kilograms and carried “two payloads that provide[d] high-resolution  
(4-meter) panchromatic images alongside medium-resolution (32-meter) multi-spectral 
images with an ultra-wide 600 kilometer imaging swath” making it the highest resolution 
smallsat at the time of its creation.282 China added two optical smallsats to the 
constellation in 2008 and was continuing to develop additional smallsats for 
replenishment.283  
In 2008, China launched the Shenzou 7 and the astronauts onboard released a 
companion satellite that has been labeled the BX-1, which stands for the Chinese term for 
companion satellite (ban sui wei xing).284 The experiment was an important first step in 
expanding the rendezvous and proximity operation capabilities of China’s smallsats. The 
forty kilogram BX-1 smallsat was spring-released from the orbital module and carried a 
camera that would allow color pictures to be taken out to a distance of two kilometers.285 
The smallsat orbited the launch module on an elliptical track and then was brought closer 
to it through a series of thruster maneuverings to allow the BX-1 to shoot over 
1,000 pictures of the module.286 The successful test was a precursor to more complex 
docking maneuvers and was part of a planned series of tests to gain experience in the 
inspection of a larger satellite.287 
In June 2011, a Chinese firm announced a collaborative effort with the Surrey 
Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL) to build three high-resolution optical satellites for the 
Chinese government.  The smallsats are 350 kilograms in size and are larger than what 
China has built and favored in the recent past, but will provide a one-meter resolution 
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capability.288 The proposed project is highly indicative of the continued Chinese push to 
build low-cost satellites that are increasingly capable and highly reconstitutable. The joint 
venture is being funded at a cost of $170 million with an expected launch in 2014.  It will 
be a valuable addition to the Chinese disaster monitoring capability, as well as a 
significant advance in electro-optics.289  
D.  CHINESE SPACE SECURITY STRATEGY 
 China’s current space security strategy involves a continued pursuit of 
counterspace capabilities partly in response to stated U.S. space policy and as part of a 
comprehensive strategy to build its national strength.290 The majority of military 
planning documents during the recent George W. Bush administration called for the 
“U.S. control of space and the achievement of global military superiority through the use 
of weapons in or from space.”291 U.S. Air Force Doctrine Document 2–2.1 set a 
precedent in 2004 and officially articulated counterspace as a part of the Air Force’s 
overarching mission.292 The document codified U.S. intentions not only to weaponize 
space, but also conduct anti-satellite operations, possibly preemptively, against enemy 
military satellites as well as those with primarily civilian functions and satellites owned 
by third-parties.293    
 During the past two decades, China has observed with great interest the U.S. 
military’s growing dependence on space assets, beginning with the Gulf War in 1991 and 
intensifying with the more recent conflicts with Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. space 
capabilities have been a critical force enhancer for our military forces and have 
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fundamentally shaped China’s strategic perceptions. When coupled with the U.S. policy 
and military documentation, China perceives that the United States is intent on the 
weaponization of space.294 Throughout the past decade, the Bush administration also 
advocated for the development of a layered missile defense system that consisted of 
mobile ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) interceptors and a variety of possible 
space-based components. The interceptors had the ability to threaten and strike satellites 
in LEO and were viewed by the Chinese as a likely first step toward an eventual arms 
race in space and as a potential threat to China’s homeland and nuclear deterrent.295 The 
United States active pursuit of space superiority upset the delicate strategic balance and 
posed an increasing risk to China’s national security.  
 During the past decade, China has been actively involved in pursuing a diplomatic 
course of action while simultaneously advancing its military space program. China 
actively engaged with Russia to broker proposals at the CD and the United Nations for 
the prevention of space weaponization, but has been blocked by the United States 
because of a lack of credible verification measures. China again pursued a diplomatic 
course in 2008 and advocated the PPWT along with Russia, but again met with resistance 
from the United States because of its lack of verification and the lack of prohibition of 
earth-based ASATS.296 China has come to the realization that the United States is not 
likely to sign any immediate treaty because of a lack of trust and the possible strategic 
disadvantage to U.S space capabilities. As a result, China has moved to negotiate from a 
position based on strength and has actively embraced a military hedging strategy. 
 Although it can be dangerous to make sweeping generalizations based upon 
historical events, the post-1949 development of China’s space program can be best 
explained by the influence of politics on it.297 Political factors have had the greatest 
impact on the direction of space system development and the country’s pursuit of 
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technologies such as smallsats. China has experienced “a heightened sense of insecurity 
in space and its calls for a separate space command in response to the U.S. drive for 
space control have additional significance for the development of its military space 
initiatives and its eventual ASAT test.” 298 Learning a valuable lesson from past Soviet 
failures, China has been careful not to overextend itself in its acquisition of technology, 
while at the same time making tremendous progress toward superpower status. China 
successfully launched its first man-rated research module into orbit in September 2011 
and docked with it just two months later. The program is in the second stage of a ten-year 
effort to build a manned space station before the year 2020.299 The nation’s nineteen 
successful space launches in 2011 exceeded the U.S. number for the first time in history, 
and has announced plans for the launch of thirty satellites in 2012.300  
 Although Sino-U.S. space relations have improved with the election of the Obama 
administration and its adoption of a multilateral and cooperative approach to space, the 
Communist Party has recently announced an ambitious multi-year space program to 
challenge the U.S. program.301 China’s white paper on the nation’s space program 
describes China’s five-year strategy to develop its space activities, transform economic 
development, and pursue cooperation with the international community.302 Although 
China is still several years behind the United States in terms of capability, the plan 
highlights “the government’s commitment to draw military and civilian resources to meet 
these goals” and the continued emergence of the nation as a global space actor.303  
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E. SUMMARY  
 Since its inception, the Chinese space program has been heavily influenced by the 
political direction adopted by its leadership. This influence shaped the development of 
the program and the pursuit of national power and prestige. China’s progress has been 
both significant and troubling, as the country has acquired tremendous technological 
capability in a relatively short time without the benefit of the experience that usually goes 
along with that development. China and its military leadership have grown to rely on the 
capabilities provided from space and on the international prestige and benefits derived 
from their many space accomplishments.  Although the recent ASAT test was developed 
by the military as a hedging strategy to counter the perceived American threat, a 
multitude of factors to include the international community’s reaction and additional 
space debris have influenced Chinese space policy against continued testing.  
 No other nation’s space program has come so far and as fast as has the Chinese 
space program. China has made a concerted political effort to gain international prestige 
through its varied space accomplishments and to become one of the leaders of space-
faring nations. Although China has been highly active in introducing diplomatic 
initiatives to avoid an arms race in space and the destabilization of strategic parity with 
both the United States and Russia, the space program has continued to acquire, develop, 
and launch military space systems and become a world leader in the development of 
smallsats.  Chapter V will address suggested courses of action for U.S. policy-makers to 
implement regarding the proliferation of Chinese smallsats to guarantee the common 





Men who have worked together to reach the stars are not likely to descend together into 
the depths of war and desolation. 
 
— Then U.S. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson,  
addressing the U.N. General Assembly, November 17, 1958  
 
A. HISTORICAL LESSONS  
 The early years of the Space Age were dominated by the superpowers, the Soviet 
Union and the United States. Although these two nations were locked in a geo-political 
struggle, these two active space-faring countries were able to establish an institutional 
framework to foster cooperation in space. The initial United States-sponsored effort 
resulted in the 1958 United Nations (U.N.) Resolution 1348, which created the ad hoc 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).304  The committee was 
designed to consider a range of issues: the activities and resources of the U.N, the 
specialized agencies, and other international bodies relating to the peaceful uses of outer 
space; the organizational arrangements to facilitate international cooperation in the field 
within the framework of the U.N.; and the legal problems which could arise in programs 
to explore outer space.305  
But the new organization met some initial resistance from the Soviet Union, 
Poland, and Czechoslovakia, which viewed the new organization as being dominated by 
Western member states. This opposition resulted in further expansion of the committee 
membership a year later when the U.N. General Assembly made COPUOS a permanent 
committee with U.N. Resolution 1472. Its membership now included communist bloc 
member states Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, but Cold War tensions kept the 
committee from meeting until 1961.306 The United Nations expanded the committee’s 
membership again in 1961 and finally began to address many of the legal questions 
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surrounding space.307 Early successes led to the acceptance of international law in space 
and the registration of launched bodies by member states through a 1963 U.N. resolution 
created with COPUOUS input, but suffered from an effective means of enforcement.308  
Although the committee initially experienced political setbacks, COPUOS was a 
successful attempt by the international community to collectively shape the use of space 
for peaceful use and began the process of creating critical linkages that led to later 
diplomatic achievements.   
1.  Successful ASAT Arms Control Measures 
 Although a framework for space cooperation had been established, it was not until 
the series of atmospheric nuclear ABM weapon tests by both the United States and the 
Soviet Union occurred in the early 1960s that the notion of cooperative restraint began to 
emerge. Both nations were becoming increasingly dependent on space services and 
undertook their first steps toward a common goal of securing space for future activity.309  
The nuclear scare of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the desire to find a common ground for 
space cooperation brought about the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 
1963 to ban nuclear tests “in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or 
under water.” 310 Although the treaty did not ban the deployment of nuclear weapons in 
space, it did prohibit further nuclear testing and explosions and a U.N. resolution passed 
that fall called upon states to ban all WMD in orbit. The signing of the PTBT was 
significant because it brought the two adversaries together to protect both the fragile 
environment of space and the capabilities enabled from this domain. Perhaps more 
importantly, these talks paved the way for a departure from a unilateral approach to space 
to now promote space cooperation between the two nations. 
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 The enhanced cooperation carried over throughout the 1960s culminating in the 
signing of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 with the stated goal of “recognizing the 
common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space 
for peaceful purposes.”311 The agreement “banned all military activities on the Moon and 
other celestial bodies…and removed [them] from territorial competition by declaring 
them to be ‘the province of all mankind’.”312 The language of the treaty did not prohibit 
ground-based, sea-based, air-based, or co-orbital kinetic-kill ASATs, but did express the 
idea that space activities were to be carried out to benefit mankind and contribute to 
peace. Although the treaty did not ban military activities in space, it did afford both 
countries a basic measure of protection against attack of their satellite systems and was 
meant to guarantee free and equal access to all areas of space. The treaty was at least in 
partial response to the growing technological space race between the two actors, and the 
agreement continued the shifting of both countries’ space policy back to a pursuit of a 
space sanctuary school of thought.   
The cooperative effort carried over throughout the signing of the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT) and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The 
verification provisions of both SALT I and II agreements included language that the 
parties shall agree “not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the 
other party.”313 Article IX of the SALT II agreement specifically prohibited the 
development, testing or deployment of “systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear 
weapons or any kind of weapons of mass destruction, including Fractional Orbital 
Bombardment Systems (FOBS).”314 As a result, Article IX created an additional legal 
obstacle to the employment of ASATs.  With the ABM Treaty, both the United States 
and the Soviet Union agreed not to deploy ABMs except under the conditions set forth 
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within the agreement. The treaty limited the deployment, testing, and use of national 
missile systems designed to intercept incoming strategic or long-range missiles.315 Given 
the close resemblance between ASAT and ABM technology, an ASAT weapon would be 
prohibited by the treaty if the weapon was capable of negating strategic ballistic missiles. 
Although these treaties were not specifically developed and signed with ASATs as a 
fundamental feature, they did provide an important first step in indirectly prohibiting 
ASAT systems and were the foundation of strategic stability for their duration. 
2. Failed ASAT Arms Control Negotiations  
Following the SALT and ABM Treaty negotiations, both the United States and 
the Soviet Union looked to build upon their earlier successful ABM arms control 
initiatives that also indirectly impacted the arms control of ASATs. Although space 
cooperation had floundered during this period, a series of exploratory talks were held 
between both countries to discuss devoted ASAT limitations. During the early years of 
bilateral negotiations while restrictions were being discussed, both countries were in a 
détente period and had suspended their testing.   At the conclusion of the third set of talks 
in 1979, the countries had reached an impasse over restrictions and further negotiation 
was put on hold as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that year. The talks 
were important for discussing the two critical themes: limits on the employment of 
ASATs and limits on the development of ASAT capabilities.316 Although the discussions 
met with only limited success, the negotiations signaled an interest by both parties to 
explore diplomatic options as well as the difficulty in obtaining an expedient solution.  
During the early 1980s, the Soviets again explored the idea of space arms control 
treaties and submitted several draft treaties to the United Nations. The provisions of the 
1981 and 1983 Soviet draft treaties reflected many of the major issues that were raised in 
earlier discussions between both parties. The 1981 draft would have restricted further 
development and testing of ground-based or air-launched ASATs, but would have 
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allowed both countries to keep their current systems.317  The 1983 draft expanded upon 
this language to now call for a ban on all ASAT testing and the elimination of all ASAT 
systems.318 Although the Reagan administration was actively pursuing the development 
of the SDI system and expressed little interest in limitations on these weapons, members 
of Congress began to exert pressure on the DoD and the administration to halt planned 
U.S. Air Force testing. Their interest resulted in the banning of additional ASAT testing 
after the 1985 kinetic test in space within subsequent appropriation bills and, ultimately, 
in the abandonment of the program altogether.  
Throughout the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union continued to present a series of 
treaty proposals to prohibit the creation or use of space weapons in space and regularly 
presented them at the United Nations, COPUOS, and the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) in Geneva.319 The Soviets also began to regularly submit resolutions to the UN 
General Assembly condemning an arms race in outer space. Meaningful progress was 
made in the reduction of strategic offensive arms and intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
and, although the Soviets declared their willingness to set up a strict monitoring system to 
promote the prohibition of ASATs, little additional progress occurred.320  
After the fall of the Soviet Union, many of the ASAT arms control initiatives 
were shelved as Russia underwent significant political turmoil and the United States 
lacked a rival in space. As the United States continued to increase its reliance on space 
for its military and economic benefits, the debate again reemerged over the 
weaponization of space in the late 1990s. Several congressional reports were issued on 
the threat of foreign missile proliferation and U.S. military space security, which 
culminated in the release of the Rumsfeld Commission report of 2001.  This study 
highlighted the vulnerability of U.S. space systems and warned of the need to counter this 
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perceived threat.321  Although this viewpoint was tempered by experts skeptical of the 
effective employment of space weapons, the Bush administration withdrew from the 
ABM Treaty in 2002 and ended its ASAT moratorium in 2008 with its shoot-down of the 
NRO satellite (U.S. 193). Although both China and Russia have made several recent 
diplomatic initiatives to the United Nations, the current status of ASAT arms control has 
remained deadlocked and ineffectual. The challenge to today’s space actors will be to 
apply the lessons learned from previous ASAT diplomatic efforts to stem the growing 
threat posed by smallsats.  
B. SMALLSATS THREAT?  
 As discussed in this thesis, the revitalization of interest in smallsats is creating 
new opportunities for a multitude of space actors but also producing challenges in the 
ASAT area that must be overcome to improve the collective space security environment 
for today’s space powers. 
 The resurgence of smallsat interest has resulted in the application of the 
technology across a broad spectrum ranging from remote sensing to surveillance to flight 
hardware test platforms for follow-on vehicles.  The United States, Russia, and China 
have all demonstrated increasing proficiency throughout the last decade as each nation 
has tested smallsats to varying degrees. The adoption of CubeSat standards across the 
satellite industry and the growing availability of secondary payload launch opportunities 
on the SpaceX Falcon 9 rockets have revitalized smallsat development and increased the 
proliferation of this cheap and readily available technology.322  In 2010, twenty-six 
smallsats in total were launched with four of them classified as microsats, seventeen as 
the smaller nanosats, and the other five the even smaller picosats.323  This trend looks to 
continue as more opportunities become available through foreign, commercial, and 
NASA launches throughout 2012.  
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 As the number of smallsats continues to increase, the challenges of regulating the 
employment of these potential dual-use technologies continues to grow for all space-
faring governments.  As noted space policy analyst Joan Johnson-Freese notes “space 
hardware is an essential part of globalization” and the recent smallsat rendezvous test 
activities of the United States and China uniquely highlight both the military and civilian 
potential of this technology.324 The current collective space security environment faces 
an increasingly complex set of challenges to which there are no easy answers.  
C. SMALLSATS ARMS CONTROLS? 
 Following the recent ASAT shoot-down events accomplished by both China and 
the United States in 2007 and 2008 respectively, there has been an increased emphasis 
from within the international community to build upon the existing legal institutions of 
outer space. Significant progress was made throughout the early decades of spaceflight to 
prevent an arms race in outer space, but international diplomacy   has been limited during 
the past fifteen years. Recent efforts by multiple actors have yielded little success to erect 
legal barriers against the renewal of a space weapons race.     
One noteworthy effort that is gaining momentum and was recently endorsed by 
the Obama administration on January 17, 2012: the development of an international Code 
of Conduct for space. The goal of the draft code of conduct is “to prevent irresponsible 
behavior in space, reduce the quantity of space debris in Earth’s orbit, and ultimately 
make outer space more sustainable as a domain for exploration, observation, 
telecommunications, and navigation.”325 Originally introduced by the European Union in 
2008, the code of conduct is intended to enhance space security and to prevent outer 
space from becoming an area of conflict.326 Critics of the proposal fear that the initiative 
will lead to binding U.S. military restrictions in space where the United States still 
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maintains a strategic advantage over its competitors.327 The Obama administration has 
stated that the United States will subscribe to a code if “it protects and enhances the 
national and economic security of the United States, our allies, and our friends, and; it 
does not hamper, limit, or prevent the United States from using space for peaceful 
purposes, including national security related activities.”328 The administration’s support 
signifies a fundamental shift in space policy and will continue negotiations with the 
major space-faring nations toward the acceptance of a final document based upon the 
current EU draft. 
With the continued growth of non-state actors, outer space is “becoming 
increasingly congested, contested, and competitive” as articulated in the recent U.S. 
National Security Space Strategy.329 Space congestion is a growing problem and the 
DoD currently tracks over 22,000 man-made objects greater than 10 centimeters in length 
of which, only 1,100 are active satellites.330 With the acquisition of enhanced ground and 
space radar systems, the number of tracked objects in orbit will grow exponentially. As 
smallsat technology continues to become cheaper and more easily accessible, the 
question arises as to whether a legal framework needs to be established to regulate and 
constrain these space vehicles’ operations and behavior.  With the international space 
community discussing a code of conduct, the time has arrived to draw upon the lessons 
learned from past ASAT arms control discussions to explore the options for regulating 
smallsat behavior.   
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1. Obstacles to Smallsat Arms Control 
 Even with the necessary political commitment from today’s major space-faring 
nations, meaningful smallsat arms control initiatives face several formidable challenges 
to their acceptance. Three obstacles among many stand out to implement effective 
measures: the lack of an existing set of guidelines for smallsats; the growing capabilities 
of smallsats; and the inherent problem of verifying smallsat capabilities. The latter two 
factors overlap since doubts of verification spring from an imprecise knowledge of the 
smallsats currently in orbit, and what the true capabilities of those smallsats are. The 
relative significance of these obstacles is in many respects proportional to the extent of 
the proposed limitations on smallsats as we shall examine in greater detail. 
 One of the most fundamental obstacles to constraining smallsats is the lack of a 
legal framework that mandates smallsats’ compliance within the existing space treaty 
framework for all space actors. Although some countries, such as Austria and Belgium, in 
2011 have moved to remedy this legal shortsightedness through the introduction of 
national legislation, the growing number of smallsat launches and the readily available 
technology make effective oversight a challenge.331 Both of the afore-mentioned 
countries are party to the Outer Space Treaty and are moving forward to participate in the 
European Union’s (EU) Galileo navigational satellite system as well as to develop their 
own indigenous smallsat capability.332 The Austrian legislation has mandated permits for 
all space activities that originate from or on Austrian territory or by any Austrian person 
or entity. 333 The legislation will also create a domestic registry for space objects and has 
outlined the penalties for the violation of its provision.334  Smallsat legislation has also 
been examined by other EU countries to include the Netherlands, where the current 
launch and governance of nanosats falls outside of their existing space law.335 Rather 
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than follow the Austrian example and introduce stricter legislation, the Dutch government 
has been hesitant to license and regulate the launch and mission activities.336 Current 
Dutch space policy does not mandate the registry of Cubesats, in part because they are 
normally not maneuverable, unless they are procured by the state, and additional 
legislation would require significant oversight from Dutch federal agencies to ensure 
their compliance with existing international space law.337  As one of the leading 
European developers of smallsats, this lack of oversight has been characteristic of many 
of the countries operating smallsats in space and potentially poses a problem to other 
space actors.  
As smallsats become greater in number in orbit, defining what can be constituted 
as a “weapon” becomes a formidable hurdle, as evidenced by the 2009 collision of the 
Iridium communications satellite with a defunct Russian weather satellite.  Any satellite, 
even a smallsat, can become a weapon if it is put on a collision course with another 
satellite from the high velocities and kinetic energies achievable in orbit.  The close 
proximity operations illustrated in recent years by both China and the United States and a 
number of other actors to include the EU, Russia, and Japan, demonstrate an increasing 
ability  to maneuver and dock with other satellites. Multiple countries have developed an 
on-orbit maneuvering and reconnaissance proficiency that can be used for either 
scientific investigation or to provide valuable information and insight into existing 
resident space objects (RSO). These capabilities in and of themselves do not necessarily 
pose a challenge unless they damage, destroy, degrade, or interfere with the primary 
function of the foreign satellite system they are observing. Although the threat from 
residual systems can never be truly eliminated, the adoption of such a measure as a 
minimum operating distance could reduce satellite vulnerability and provide enhanced 
stability. 
 A third challenge to restraining smallsat behavior is that the current verification 
means and methods do not enable observers to overcome the determined efforts of an 
actor to hide intent. Any type of meaningful and effective arms control requires the tools 
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for verification. Any reasonable approach would require both a ground capability and 
national technical means (NTM) be among the permitted verification processes. The 
United States has today’s most advanced ground-based observation system, and although 
it is capable of observing objects out to medium Earth orbit (MEO) with great detail, the 
ability to characterize and discriminate falls off proportionately depending on an object’s 
size and altitude. No space actors would want to be totally dependent on another country 
for their own verification and many countries’ own existing space situational awareness 
capabilities are too immature for such a task. Other verification means could include 
launch manifest declarations or on-site launch inspections of satellite payloads.338 
However, with even the most stringent on site-inspections, the question arises as to what 
to look for to verify intent.339 Given the dual-use nature of many of the smallsat 
payloads, it would be a daunting if not impossible task to verify intent. In the absence of 
definitive intent, there would be no realistic way to reach a timely decision based upon 
the current verification tools at hand. 
2. Benefits to Smallsat Arms Control  
 While the obstacles to constraining smallsats appear formidable, the potential 
benefits to doing so could provide significant advantages to the collective space security 
environment for all space operators. Although it would require a major commitment from 
all parties that launch and operate smallsats, the benefits could foster enhanced strategic 
stability, yield significant cost savings, and buttress additional space arms control 
activities.  
 One major benefit from restricting smallsat operations is the reduced likelihood of 
attack or malicious behavior by another satellite in orbit. From the very beginning of the 
space race, early warning and strategic communication satellites have played a critical 
part in providing stability to relations between the major space actors. Much of the 
aforementioned legal institutions have been developed to avoid an arms race in space and 
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to provide security for both the civilian and military activities.340 Many nations have 
become increasingly dependent on space utilities in the context of growing economic 
globalization and with the onset of the information age to not only support state 
economies but to provide common goods and services to their populations. With an 
increasing number of space-faring nations and actors, restrictions on smallsat behavior 
would provide enhanced stability. The likelihood for any misperception is significantly 
decreased if bounds are placed on the activities or interaction of smallsats with a nation’s 
critical space systems.  
 A second major benefit from the restriction of smallsats would be the realization 
of significant cost savings for the major space actors who are the most dependent on 
space. With the recent ASAT events, a number of nations (to include the United States, 
Russia, India, and China) have spent considerable time investigating technologies to 
bolster their satellite defensive capabilities and to counter adversarial behaviors. The 
constrainment of smallsat behavior would provide enhanced security for satellite systems 
and obviate the need for extensive research and development costs to counter smallsats. 
Although it is still likely that these nations would continue to hedge against the prospect 
of cheating, it is still reasonable to assume the cost would be far less than if no arms 
control initiatives were in place. 
 Lastly, the acceptance of smallsat arms control has the potential to buttress 
existing arms control treaties as well as to become an impetus for the broader space code 
of conduct efforts currently underway. By imposing restrictions on smallsats, the 
limitations would be part of the bigger international space community’s effort designed to 
encompass both the civilian and military uses of space.  If made part of the more general 
code of conduct, a smallsat agreement could include a commitment to refrain from 
intentionally harming space systems, measures to control and mitigate space debris, and 
mechanisms for consultation. Smallsat arms control would have the added benefit of 
improving the international climate for enhanced cooperation and could lead to enhanced 
cooperation between multiple space actors in the community.     
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D. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION 
 There are at least three potential courses of action the United States could pursue 
in its negotiations to decrease the growing threat of smallsats. First, U.S. space policy 
officials could push for an agreement that delineates certain sectors of space as off-limits 
for smallsat testing, employment, or usage.341 Given the challenging task of observing 
small satellites in MEO or higher orbits, it is tempting to recommend that smallsats be 
constrained to operate within LEO so that they can be monitored from existing ground 
assets.  Many nations, however, have the majority of their high value reconnaissance, 
weather, tracking, and communications assets in LEO and defining this region as an 
operational area for smallsats would be highly contentious. Another possibility includes 
the implementation of a “keep-out” or exclusion zone, similar to what is has been 
adopted by states within its territorial waters.  This exclusion zone out to a set distance of 
approximately 10 kilometers would enhance space security and decrease the risk of 
malicious behavior. The challenge again would be the maintenance of this buffer zone as 
many of the smallsat operators do not have the expertise or available technology to 
maintain an exact distance in a crowded orbital environment.   
 A second path the United States can pursue is to increase its transparency for 
future space activities and to initiate a number of confidence-building measures (CBMs) 
across the international space community.  By increasing transparency, space actors are 
able to more clearly signal their intent for the operation of their space activities. Along 
with transparency, CBMs look to provide a level of information through consultation, 
notification, or access to make information available to other actors.342 Through the 
implementation of the previously mentioned legal institutions, there was a general 
restraining influence on behavior between the United States and the Soviet Union.  As the 
number of actors has grown, the challenge to craft and implement effective CBMs has 
created additional complexities. Efforts have been made from both the bottom up to 
include Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, as well as, from the top down with the joint 
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Russia-China PPWT proposals. When applied to smallsats, the biggest hurdle to 
overcome will be to devise effective measures that are applicable to smallsats in both the 
private and public sectors to share data and information with commercial, educational, 
and foreign entities. The implementation of CBMs for smallsat space activity can be best 
achieved through the pursuit of a multilateral space agreement, whereby its signatories 
abide by a set of worldwide rules for the registration of smallsat launches and flight 
plans, possibly in advance, via the U.N. Registration Convention. The registration would 
provide basic information to include the launching state, the date and country of launch, 
the smallsat’s orbital parameters, the general function of the smallsat, and the planned 
mean mission duration.  This basic information would provide greater transparency and 
alleviate much of the uncertainty around the operation of smallsats.  Although the 
verification and enforcement of smallsat CBMs for such a diverse audience make this a 
complex course of action to recommend, the additional stability to space security make it 
worthwhile to investigate in greater detail.     
  Finally, a third option the United States could pursue is to take an active 
leadership role in strengthening space security through cooperation with other nations to 
ensure free access to and responsible behavior in space.343 The emergence of new actors 
in space has changed the geostrategic balance in space and will continue to influence the 
acceptance of international space policy making. The United States has long been a 
leading space actor and highly influential in establishing what is viewed as the traditional 
norms for acceptable behavior. With the increasing presence of additional actors to 
include private operators, there is a greater need to integrate them into an international 
dialogue on space security initiatives by establishing international norms such as 
notification of space vehicle launches, closer coordination of space activities, and 
compliance with existing legislation.344 The United States could also pursue a more 
ambitious course and endorse the adoption of specific guidelines to include a ban on 
close proximity operations for smallsats and the adoption of end-of-life satellite 
measures. The implementation of these requirements would add to collective space 
                                                 
343 Jana Robinson, “Space Security through the transatlantic partnership,” Space Policy, Vol. 28, 
(February, 2012), 61–62.  
344 Ibid.  
 97 
security while simultaneously mitigating the increasing orbital debris problem.  Another 
option for increased collaboration would be through the sharing of ground radar tracking 
information with the international space community. The United States is already 
pursuing this option through its Space Fence radar acquisition, where it is partnering with 
the United Kingdom and Australia and this data-sharing could be expanded.  As the 
number of smallsats continues to increase, there will be a growing demand for the 
establishment of regulatory requirements and space governance that will ameliorate the 
collective space security environment. The challenges to space security through such 
activities as smallsat operations need to be discussed in policy forums such as COPUOS, 
whereby knowledgeable experts can deal with practical issues. Lastly, the United States 
needs to be at the forefront of defining best practice procedures and guidelines through 
such measures as the European Code of Conduct with its international partners and 
commercial operators. The draft code is an important first step toward forging a better 
comprehension of responsible space activities, bolstering multilateral discussions among 
actors, and improving the sustainability of space.   Although this course of action signals 
a paradigm shift from previous policy recommendations, this pursuit of international 
smallsat guidelines promises to enable the United States to become a key leader in 
defining operations with the goal of enhancing space security for the 21st century.    
E. CONCLUSION  
 The United States continues to possess a significant technical and economic 
strategic advantage in space but this lead over its competitors is shrinking as new space 
actors have established a presence in space. As the space hegemon, the United States has 
the most to lose because of its reliance on its satellite system to support its broad military 
and civilian space activities. Technological advancements in the last decade have 
improved the ability of smallsats to maneuver and operate in orbit. Undoubtedly, these 
technologies and processes will continue to improve as new advancements are developed 
and launched. What is not certain, however, is what changes will occur in the geopolitical 
environment or how others will interpret those changes.  
Debates on ASAT arms control and testing have been an integral part of the 
collective space security debate for the better part of sixty years. The renewed round of 
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ASAT activities in 2007 and 2008 and the emerging threat potential of smallsats 
represents the latest round of discussions on this topic. Reviewing the various options to 
strengthen the collective space security environment reveals three general points about a 
proposed U.S. course of action.  First, given the large number of emerging space actors, 
smallsat arms control cannot totally alleviate the threat to space systems, but rather, can 
play an important part in bounding the behavior of the actors. Furthermore, the different 
approaches to smallsat arms control can work synergistically with other treaty or code of 
conduct agreements to enhance an increasingly unstable space security environment.  
Finally, although the verification of an agreement can never be totally complete, 
establishing a truly international space situational data-sharing system would be an 
important first step toward safeguarding unhampered access to space for all. The United 
States ignores the continued development of smallsats at its own peril. The lessons drawn 
from sixty years of ASAT development and testing should help us avoid asking the 
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